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This paper investigates growth differences in the urban system of the EU12. Alternative 
dependent variables – growth in population and real GDP per capita – are analysed and 
instructive differences emerge. The US model which assumes perfect factor mobility does not 
seem well adapted to European conditions. There is evidence strongly suggesting that 
equilibrating migration flows between cities in different countries are highly constrained in 
the EU.  Models in which growth of real GDP p.c. is the dependent variable perform well and 
make it possible to test significant hypotheses. Evidence is found which is supportive of a 
spatial adaptation of the endogenous growth model with the relative size of the university 
sector having a highly significant role in explaining growth differences. In addition, the 
analysis supports the conclusion that systems of urban governance are strongly related to 
growth. The variables are formulated in a way which tests hypotheses derived from ‘fiscal 
federalism’ viewing growth promotion as the production of a local public good. While 
international migration appears to be limited as an adjustment mechanism, the density of 
urbanisation in some parts of the EU12 produces a strong local ‘growth shadow’ effect 
consistent with commuting flows having an important role in spatial economic adjustment 
processes where cities are densely packed. Finally new evidence is found supporting the 
conclusion that integration shocks in the EU favour core areas but that this effect tends to 
fade with time. 
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This paper sets out to do two things. The first is to explore differences in the determinants of 
growth between cities in Europe and those in the US. The second is to test specific hypotheses 
about the growth processes of cities in general but cities in a European context in particular. 
Three issues are of special interest. The first is how and to what extent adjustment to localised 
disequilibria occurs in a European context, characterised by dense urbanisation but relatively 
immobile labour. The second is to explore the relationship between systems of city 
government and city growth performance. Here we test one of the basic propositions of fiscal 
federalism: that 'the existence and magnitude of spillover effects clearly depends on the 
geographical extent of the relevant jurisdiction' (Oates, 1999). Specifically we test that there 
is a positive relationship between the degree of co-incidence of governmental boundaries with 
those of functionally defined city-regions and the growth performance of the city-region. The 
third issue which we explore is the role of human capital in explaining urban growth 
differentials. Here we are interested in testing a spatialised adaptation of endogenous growth 
theory (see Cheshire and Carbonaro, 1995 or, for a more rigorous development, Magrini, 
1998). 
 
The results strongly suggest that the model widely used in the US - both in the quality of life 
literature (Blomquist et al, 1988; Gyourko and Tracey, 1991; Gyourko et al., 1999) and in the 
analysis of urban growth (Glaeser et al, 1995; Rappaport, 1999) - is inappropriate for a 
European context. The evidence presented here suggests that labour in Europe is 
geographically immobile and, in as far as there is mobility, it is a within country phenomenon. 
The central assumption of perfectly mobile factors and the equalisation of real marginal 
returns across cities explicit in the US models cannot reasonably be maintained in the 
European context, therefore.  
 
This immediately suggests that the most appropriate variable to measure cities' comparative 
economic performance within the EU is the rate of growth of real GDP per capita (as with 
across country studies) rather than population growth. The empirical results reported in this 
paper are fully consistent with this conclusion. While our analysis of differential rates of 
urban population growth suggests that migration is a very imperfect means of adjustment 
across the EU, however,  it does not suggest that labour fails to respond to differential spatial 
opportunities where adjustment can occur without migration. We find that where cities are 
closely packed and are contiguous – as in the Benelux countries and much of England and 
Germany - changes in commuting flows appear to be a significant alternative but more 
localised source of adjustment. 
 
In our analysis of the variation between cities in their capacity to generate local growth 
promotion policies we should clarify from the outset that we do not conceive of such policies 
in the narrow sense in which their advocates often speak of them: as policies aimed at the 
direct attraction of mobile investment. Apart from the evidence that such policies have a 
doubtful value even for the regional economies that successfully attract such investment and 
that inward investment accounts for only a small proportion of local employment growth in 
any region (Cheshire and Gordon, 1998) we have a much broader definition of 'growth 
promotion policies' in mind. Such policies include: having a concern for efficient public 
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administration so that uncertainty is reduced; making sure relevant infrastructure is provided 
and maintained; co-ordination between public and private investment; providing training 
which is relevant and effective; and ensuring that land use policy is flexible and co-ordinated 
with infrastructure provision and the demands of private sector investors. It would also 
involve giving a higher priority to output growth as opposed to equity or environmental 
outcomes. It need not involve the expenditure of a greater volume of resources, even on 
infrastructure, so a simple measure of local spending is unlikely to be an appropriate measure 
of the efficacy of growth promotion efforts even were such a variable available. Grand 
projects such, perhaps, as the Guggenheim museum in Bilbao or a trophy metro system in 
Toulouse – may be expensive but not productive; efficient public administration and 
reduction of uncertainty for private investment by rapid decision-making, clearly defined land 
use policies and infrastructure planning, may cost less than their inefficient alternatives. 
 
Since the output of such policies is the impact they have on local growth performance they 
can be viewed as the provision of a pure local public good
2.  It will be hard to impossible to 
exclude agents who have not contributed to the policy from any benefits it may generate. And 
there will be a zero opportunity cost in consumption: if your rents rise so do mine and the 
increase in yours is not a cost to me; if your employment opportunities improve that, too, is 
not a cost to mine. Thus the closer the coincidence in the boundaries of the governmental unit 
providing such policies with those of the economic region within which their impact is 
contained the less will be the spatial spillovers. In addition, the larger is the central unit of 
government of an economically self-contained urban region relative to the size of that region 
as a whole the lower will be the transactions costs in building a 'growth-coalition'. One way of 
modelling this idea is set out in section 2. We conclude that there is evidence of a strong 
relationship between the degree of coincidence of governmental and economic boundaries in 
EU cities and their growth performance. Our evidence is consistent with both the basic 
premises of fiscal federalism, therefore, and the conditionality of the provision of local public 
goods. It is, furthermore, consistent with there being some systematic contribution that local 
public administration can make to local growth performance. 
 
All the analysis is performed on a data set built up over a 25 year period relating to Functional 
Urban Regions (FURs) defined
3 so far as possible according to common criteria across the 
EU of 12. Such FURs correspond to the economic spheres of influence of significant 
employment concentrations and are relatively self-contained in economic terms. The analysis 
is conducted only for FURs with a population of more than one third of a million and a core 
city which exceeded 200 000 at some date between 1951 and 1981. Cities of the former 
eastern Länder of Germany and Berlin have to be excluded because of lack of data. The new 
basis on which Eurostat estimated regional GDP from 1995 onwards means that the analysis 
stops then. The variables used are defined in Appendix 1 which also provides a brief 
                                                 
2 The local public good, non-excludable and non-rival in consumption, is, of course the growth they may 
produce. Resources employed in the promotion of growth are simply a cost. 
3 For a detailed discussion of the definition of the FURs used throughout this paper see Cheshire and Hay (1989). 
They are defined on the basis of core cities identified by concentrations of employment and hinterlands from which 
more commuters flow to the employment core than to any other subject to a minimum cut off. They were defined on 
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relationship between administrative boundaries and the economic reality of European cities and regions introduces 
serious error and a strong likelihood of bias into data reported for administratively defined cities. The FUR/city and 
region of Bremen provide an extreme but not wholly unrepresentative example. Because of population relative to 
employment decentralisation over the relevant period the growth of GDP p.c. is overstated by some 40% if the 
published Eurostat data for the administrative region is relied on. 4 
description of how they were measured and the sources used.  All data are defined to common 
statistical concepts either weighting data available from the Eurostat REGIO database to 
estimate values for FURs or collected directly from national statistical offices or common data 
providers and adjusted where necessary to common definitions. There is necessarily some 
imperfection and imprecision in such data but they have the merit of not only allowing 
analysis of specifically European cities but also of allowing the investigation of questions 
which, because of lack of variation, simply could not be investigated in the context of the US 
urban system.  
 
Since the focus of this paper is regional fixed effects, the analysis employs OLS but we 
provide substantial testing to ensure the results are not subject to econometric problems. We 
have also subjected them to tests for spatial autocorrelation. Since the observations represent 
the population of West European city-regions the other objections raised by Levine and 
Renelt (1992) or Levine and Zervos (1993) to the use of cross sectional OLS in cross country 
growth studies do not seem to apply.   
 
2.  Some practical and theoretical considerations 
 
Within the EU geographic labour mobility is an order of magnitude less than in the US. If, for 
example, we measure net inter-regional population mobility, using similarly sized regions in 
both the US and the EU then the incidence of mobility is higher by a factor of 15 in the US. 
Taking the weighted mean net migration flows between the 51 US states over the decade of 
the 1990s and expressing that per person in 1992 yields a mobility rate of 0.005255 – or about 
0.5%. Data on net migration at an interregional level are not available for all the EU12 
countries so we have to exclude Italy and Portugal. But if the remaining large countries – 
France, Germany, Spain and the UK are divided into their Level 1 regions (in Germany the 
Länder or in Britain the Standard Regions) and the smaller countries are treated as single units 
then for the resulting 47 territorial units the weighted mean net migration flow over the 1990s 
was 0.000382 per person – or about 0.04%. Since the EU is substantially smaller in 
geographic terms and has larger regional differences in mean incomes one would have 
expected that net migration flows between units of roughly equal size would have been 
greater rather than smaller.  
 
We also know that comparable Eurostat GDP pc data for a complete set of regions (from 
which the FUR data are estimated) are only available for a discrete period, 1978 to 1994. We 
are thus analysing a period too short to correspond to a conceptual long run. Even if the 
system did tend to equalisation of returns to factors on the margin new shocks and 
disturbances will occur long before such a position is reached. We need therefore to model a 
system in which real incomes can permanently (in the sense of any period we can observe) 
vary between cities.  
 
Given that our observational units represent sub-national economic regions as self-contained 
as are likely to exist, what basis is there for hypothesising that their form of government – 
specifically the degree of co-incidence of the spatial boundaries of government to those of the 
FUR – are likely to be directly related to observed differences in growth rates?  Let us 
consider a FUR made up of one or more administrative units and assume that a 'club' of 
administrative units provides growth promotion policies. For simplicity let us also assume 
that the largest unit within the FUR – the central unit – is always part of the club, either alone 
or together with other administrative units, so the FUR is made up of two groups of 
economies: the policy club and the group of non-participating economies.  
 5 
The government of the policy club runs a balanced budget, levying a proportional tax on the 
quantity of output. Tax revenue Tp = τ Yp is spent on policy action and, if the club is made up 
of more than one administrative unit, on transaction costs. Assuming transaction costs are a 
constant proportion ε  of tax revenues, the total amount of resources devoted to policy action 
is: 
()p Y G τ ε − = 1          
where the constant ε  increases with the number of units belonging to the policy club
4, and 
decreases with the relative size of the central unit. Similar to Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), 
we assume that the overall effect of policy action depends on the amount of public resources 
spent per producer within the club: g = G / Lp. However, if the club does not encompass the 
entire FUR, only a share θ p (with 0  <  θ p  < 1) of the potential effect of policy action is 
effectively retained within the club 
  () p p p p y g g τ ε θ θ − = = 1         ( 1 )  
while a different portion, θ n (with 0 < θ n < 1), spills over to non-participating units.
5 In other 
words, we are assuming that the output of policy action combines two components: the return 
to the first component is appropriable by producers residing in the club, while the second 
component represents an externality that positively affects production within the remaining 
part of the FUR. 
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1 g Ak y n n n .          ( 3 )  
The representative, infinitely-lived, household populating the FUR seeks to maximise overall 
utility given by: 




ρ          ( 4 )  
where c is consumption per person, ρ > 0 is the constant rate of time preference while the 
utility function is 
() ( ) () σ
σ − − =
− 1 1
1 c c u         ( 5 )  
with σ  > 0. 
 
Let us start from the maximisation of the overall utility for the representative household 
residing within the club assuming that production factors have no incentive to move across 
administrative units.
6 As is well known, this maximisation problem implies that the club’s 
growth rate of consumption at each point in time is given by 
() ( ) ρ σ − = p p p r c c / 1         ( 6 )  
                                                 
4  In particular, there are zero transaction costs when only the central unit engages in growth promotion 
policies.  
5  Note that, given the specific nature of the effects of policy action considered here, the ability of a club 
to retain the effects of its growth policies would be a positive function of the relative size of the club with respect 
to that of the FUR. Similarly, the scale of the spillover effect positively depends on the relative size of the group 
of non-participating units. However, to simplify notation, we leave the explicit formulation for later. 
6  Since, in this present context our primary concern is the long-run growth rate of the FUR, we are 
assuming that the allocation of production factors across administrative units is such that the FUR is always in a 
position of steady-state growth. We derive this equilibrium allocation of production factors below. It is worth 
emphasising, however, that allowing for factor migration within the FUR would add transitional dynamics but 
not alter the flavour of the results. 6 
where rp is the private (after-tax) marginal return to capital
7 
() () () () ()
α α θ α τ τ
− − − − = ∂ ∂ − =
1 1 1 1 g Ak k y r p p p p p .     (7) 
Isolating yp from equation (1) and substituting into (2), we get 
() [] p p k A g
α α τ ε θ
/ 1 1 1− =
−          
so that the private marginal return to capital can be expressed as 
() ()
() ()
() α α α α α θ τ ε α τ
/ 1 / 1 / 1 1 1
− − − − = p p A r .      (8) 
The constant growth rate for all variables – c, k, y and g – can be determined by substituting 
equation (8) into (6), yielding 
() () ()
() ()
() [] ρ θ τ ε α τ σ γ
α α α α α − − − =
− − / 1 / 1 / 1 1 1 / 1 p p A .     (9) 
 
From equation (9) it is easy to show that the tax rate that maximises growth within the club is 
α τ − = 1
*            
so that the corresponding growth rate becomes 
() ( )
() ()
() () [] ρ θ ε α α σ γ
α α α α α α α − − − =
− − − / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 2 * 1 1 / 1 p p A .     (10) 
In this model, however, the club’s government would seek to maximise the level of utility 
attained by the representative household rather than the growth rate. If the tax rate is constant, 
not only consumption, capital and production per person start respectively at initial values 
cp(0), kp(0) and yp(0) and then grow at the constant rate γ p but, given the initial level of capital, 
it is also possible to determine the levels of all other variables at any point in time. In 
particular, it is possible to show that the starting level of capital is 
() [] ) 0 ( / 1 / ) 0 ( p p p k c α ρ γ α σ + − = .      (11) 
Moreover, integrating in equation (4) we can derive the level of utility attained by the 
representative household 
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where conditions in note (4) ensure that ρ  > γ p(1–σ ). Substituting cp(0) from (11), Up can be 
expressed as a function of γ p but not separately on τ  
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() () [] () σ ρ σ γ ρ σ
























U       
from which it is straightforward to show that attained utility is monotonically increasing in γ p. 
Hence, the club’s policy maker will effectively choose the growth maximising tax rate τ
* = 1 
– α , since it ensures maximisation of the representative household’s utility. 
 
Let us now turn to the group of units not participating in the policy club. Maximisation of the 
representative household’s utility described by equations (4) and (5) yields 
() ( ) ρ σ − = n n n r c c / 1 D        ( 1 2 )  
where rn is the private marginal return to capital 
() ()
α α θ α
− − − = ∂ ∂ =
1 1 g Ak k y r n n n n n .        ( 1 3 )  
Concentrating on steady-state growth equilibrium, from equation (12) we obtain 
ρ σγ + = n n r            
                                                 
7  As normal, we assume that the production function is sufficiently productive to ensure positive growth, 
but not so productive as to yield unbounded utility. The corresponding inequality conditions are 
() σ ρ − > > 1 c c r r . 7 
and substituting into equation (13) 
() ()
α α θ α ρ σγ
− − − = +
1 1 g Ak n n n .        
Taking the logs and differentiating with respect to time, we get 








.          
Since g and kn grow at the rates γ p and γ n respectively, it is clear that  p n γ γ = when both 
groups of units are in a steady-state growth position. Given that output at the FUR level is 
simply Yf = Yc + Yn and that population in each unit is constant, it is straightforward to show 
that the per capita growth rate for the FUR is 
n p f γ γ γ = = .           ( 1 4 )  
In other words, if the club policy makers choose the utility maximising tax rate 1 – α , the 
entire FUR grows at the per capita rate given in equation (10). 
 
Let us turn finally to the equilibrium allocation of production factors required by the steady-
state growth path. Starting from the allocation of capital, we note that equations (6) and (12), 
together with the fact that per capita consumption grows at the same rate in the two groups of 
units, imply that the private marginal return to capital must be the same across the FUR. 
Resorting to equations (7) and (13), this equilibrium condition requires 
() () () () ()
α α α α θ α θ α τ
− − − − − − = −
1 1 1 1 1 g Ak g Ak n n p p      
and, re-arranging terms, 
() ()
() α τ θ θ
− − =
1 / 1 1 n p n p k k .         ( 1 5 )  
Moving now to the labour market, the wage rates in the two groups of regions are 
() () ()
α α θ α τ
− − − =
1 1 1 g Ak w p p p         
and 
()( )
α α θ α
− − =
1 1 g Ak w n n n          
so that their ratio can be expressed as 
() () () τ θ θ
α α − =
− 1
1
n p n p n p k k w w .      ( 1 6 )  
Substituting (15) into (16), the ratio between wage rates becomes 
() ()
()
n p n p n p k k w w = − =
− α τ θ θ
1 / 1 1       ( 1 7 )  
showing that the ratio between wage rates is exactly equal to the corresponding ratio between 
capital per worker levels when private returns to capital are equalised. Clearly, if the cost of 
adjustment – via either commuting or change of residence – is trivial, this equilibrium is not 
stable.
8 In this case, to get a hint of the possible adjustment process and of the resulting 
equilibrium, we need to provide an explicit formulation for θ p and θ n. As emphasised in note 
(2), these shares should be positive functions of club and non-club populations relative to 
FUR population respectively. Therefore, the simplest specification we can use is  f p p L L = θ  




1 / 1 1 n p n p L L w w          
and intra-FUR wage equalisation requires 
()
() α τ
− − − =
1 / 1 1 n p L L .          ( 1 8 )  
                                                 
8  However, it is possible to conceive a stable equilibrium even in the presence of wage rate differentials 
provided that the incidence of commuting costs on the wage rate is not lower than τ  and that migration costs are 
not lower than the present value of the difference in wages. 8 
Substituting this result into equation (15), it is straightforward to show that private marginal 
return to capital equalisation also implies capital per worker equalisation,  1 = n p k k . In other 
words, with this specification of θ p and θ n, the equilibrium allocation of factors implies a 
relative size of population in the two groups of units given by equation (18) and the same 
level of capital per worker throughout the FUR. It is easy to show that this equilibrium 
allocation of production factors is stable. If, for instance, the initial allocation of labour is 
such that kp > kn, then we know from equation (17) that wp > wn, and workers will move to 
units belonging to the policy club until capital per worker ratios and wage rates are equalised. 
 
We have shown that representative household’s utility maximisation leads to the steady-state 
growth rate in equation (10) for the policy club; moreover, we have also shown (equation 14) 
that the entire FUR grows at this same rate 
() ( )
() ()
() () [] ρ θ ε α α σ γ
α α α α α α α − − − =
− − − / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 2 * 1 1 / 1 p f A .    (19) 
Starting from this result, we can therefore summarise the main implications for the empirical 
analysis as follows:  
1  the growth rate of the FUR is highest when the FUR itself is made up a single unit. 
There would be no transaction costs while all policy action effects are internalised so that the 
FUR’s growth rate becomes 
() ( )
() [] ρ α α σ γ
α α α − − =
− / 1 / 1 2 * 1 / 1 A f        
which is strictly larger than the rate in equation (19); 
2  given the size of the policy club, the FUR’s growth rate increases the smaller the are 
transaction costs, i.e. the smaller the number of units in the club and the larger the size of the 
central unit; 
3  given the incidence of transaction costs, the FUR grows faster the larger the size of the 
policy club; 
4  enlarging the club via the inclusion of additional units has conflicting effects on the 
growth rate. The increase in the number of units in the club and the reduction of the relative 
weight of the central unit within the club both increase transaction costs and thus have a 
negative effect on the growth rate. In contrast, an increase in the overall size of the club 
reduces the incidence of the spillover effects and therefore tends to increase the growth rate. 
Therefore, only when the latter effect dominates, will additional administrative units actually 
join the policy club. 
5  Finally we can simulate the relationship between the tax rate (τ) and growth rate (γ) for 
different transaction costs (ε ). Other parameter values are assumed to be as in Barro (1990), 
that is σ  = 1; α = 0.75; ρ = 0.02; A


















As in Barro (1990), the relationship between the tax rate (τ) and the growth rate of a FUR’s per 
capita GDP (γ) is quadratic: the maximum effect on growth is reached when τ equals 1-α: so 
other things equal positive transaction costs lead to slower growth. Moreover, since a similar 
relationship exists between the tax rate and the level of utility attained by representative 
household the maximum level of utility is also reached when τ equals 1-α. 
 
3. Urban population growth 
 
Glaeser et al (1995) argue that if we assume perfectly mobile factors, a common Cobb-
Douglas production function (and factors receiving the value of their marginal product) and 
quality of life decreasing in city size then it follows that population growth is the most useful 
indicator for growth in urban prosperity or welfare. People vote with their feet and if the 
combination of the real wage and quality of life they could receive in some other city is higher 
then they will move to it. This will be an equilibrating process however with equalisation of 
the combined real wage and quality of life on the margin. Population growth thus reflects both 
productivity growth and growth in a city's quality of life.  
 
Between countries however there is not free factor mobility and it may be less reasonable to 
assume a common production technology, so it is more appropriate to adjust for exchange rate 
and price differences and analyse (rates of growth of) GDP p.c. if the researcher wishes to 
investigate differences in economic well-being or rates of growth thereof. We have already 
seen that on one reasonable measure rates of net interregional migration in the US are some 
15 times greater than those in the EU. It is also possible that linguistic, cultural and 
institutional difference between European regions mean that they do not fully share a common 
production technology and that there are differences in regional rates of technical progress 
(Rodriguez-Pose, 1998). These considerations suggest the model of urban growth processes 
frequently applied in the US may be inappropriate in a European context and that in Europe 
the most relevant variable is growth in real GDP p.c.  
 
Table 3.1 : Dependent Variable Population Growth 1979 to 1994: No Geographic Variables 
 
R² 0.2590  0.3464  0.3621 
     
Constant 0.0252742  0.0216404  0.0187202 
s.e. 0.0071047  0.0065337  0.0066752 
LPOP79 -0.0011988  -0.0008343  -0.0007224 
s.e. 0.0004776  0.0004335  0.0004346 
IND -0.0001185  -0.0001342  -0.0001299 
s.e. 0.0000441  0.0000439  0.0000521 
COAL1 -0.0041312  -0.0041709  -0.0036017 
s.e. 0.0011319  0.0010264  0.0010864 
COAL2 -0.003039  -0.0030921  -0.0027498 
s.e. 0.0008313  0.0010805  0.0011096 
PORT   -0.0013931  -0.0013066 
s.e.   0.0004035  0.0004186 
PORTSQ   0.0000768  0.0000733 
s.e.   0.0000205  0.0000212 
AGR     0.0002169 
s.e.     0.0001221 
AGRSQ     -0.0000058 
s.e.     0.0000034 
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We test this proposition with a series of estimated models for EU FURs in which growth in 
population is the dependent variable. All results are estimated with robust standard errors. 
They provide evidence consistent with the hypothesis set out above so re-enforce our doubts 
as to whether population growth should, in a European context, be interpreted as an indicator 
of differential growth in urban welfare or prosperity. The results nevertheless yield interesting 
insights into adjustment processes in the EU space economy. 
 
Table 3.1 presents the results of a simple model of population growth for 121 major EU FURs 
including only the log of start of period population and alternative measures of industrial 
structure. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. IND and AGR measure the proportion of 
the labour force employed in industry and agriculture respectively in the encompassing level 2 
region in 1975. COAL1 and 2 measure the coincidence respectively of the FUR core and the 
FUR commuter hinterland with a physical coal measure; and PORT is a measure of the tons 
of traffic through ports in 1969. Employment even by such broad sectors as agriculture, 
industry and services is only available for all relevant regions for one year before 1980. It is 
reasonable to argue that the more specific resource based industries – coal mining and port 
activity – will have had a more influential negative effect on a FURs' growth than the broader 
sector – industry. Both may have had a particular effect on population growth. If quality  of 
life differences are a significant influence on the rate of population growth then both the coal 
industry and port activity which have negative impacts on the physical environment and 
perhaps also on the social environment of cities, as well as leaving a poor endowment of 
human capital, would be expected to have had a specific and identifiable impact. It is partly 
because of the environmental effect that it leaves behind that the influence of the coal industry 
is measured in terms of the physical co-incidence of the FUR with coal measures; the 
influence of a past specialisation in coal mining would endure after the industry itself had 
disappeared as a source of employment. Even by 1979, a significant number of the traditional 
mining areas of Europe had nil or negligible employment left in mining. Thus, the coal 
variable is and was intended to be independent of when mining employment declined.  
 
Ports have received little attention in the literature on declining regions. Given their historic 
importance as locations for processing industries (see for example Alonso 1964), however, 
and the way in which the technological transformation of port activity has entirely eliminated 
this role by eliminating their function as transhipment locations, the legacy of problems ports 
have left their host cities seems likely to be significant. A further aspect of the transformation 
of port activity is that it has involved a very substantial increase in capital : labour ratios. An 
industry which was labour intensive has become capital intensive. Therefore, it is reasonable 
to expect that while the general effect for a city's growth of having specialised in port activity 
would be negative some of the very largest ports might have benefited from the concentration 
of port activity in few locations. 
 
In understanding population growth, therefore, it would seem that these more precise 
measures of industrial structure which capture not just declining economic opportunity but 
also aspects of quality of life differences should provide more explanatory power than a broad 
measure of specialisation in industry. The results confirm this. In addition the results reported 
in Table 3.1 provide provisional evidence consistent with the assumption of Glaeser et al 
(1995) that quality of life is declining in city size. There is a negative relationship between 
city size and population growth. 
 
Given the belief that environmental factors are significant in determining the attractiveness of 
a city in terms of its quality of life and hence its population growth it would seem appropriate 
to explore the role of the most obvious and systematic environmental factor - climate.   11 
Glaeser et al (1995) found that dummies for cities in the south and west were highly 
significant in their models of rates of population growth across US cities. We have defined 
four continuous variables: distance south (west) within each country relative to the national 
capital and distance south (west) within the EU as a whole relative to Brussels. Given the 
evidence on the low incidence of population mobility across the regions of the EU and our 
resulting scepticism that the EU operates as one integrated economic system in the way that 
the US may then we should expect to observe a greater response to quality of life variations 
within countries than across the EU as a whole. Hence, the expectation is that there will be a 
significant relationship between a FUR's population growth and relatively how far south it is 
within its country but not between its population growth and its relative position within the 
EU as a whole. Since east-west is not nearly so closely related to climatic variation we do not 
necessarily expect any relationship between population growth and either measure of 
westness: within country or within EU. 
 
Table 3.2: Dependent Variable Population Growth 1979 to 1994: with Geographic variables 
 
R²  0.2575 0.5062 0.2683 0.5314 0.3002 
       
Constant  0.0334424 0.0254005 0.0296826 0.0160868 0.0150911 
s.e.  0.0084205 0.0063664 0.0084119 0.0055494  0.007746 
LPOP79  -0.0011558 -0.0009316 -0.0010407 -0.0008514 -0.0008782 
s.e. 0.0004877  0.0003967  0.0004792  0.000371  0.0004878 
IND -0.0002448  -0.0001572  -0.0002406     
s.e. 0.000046  0.000037  0.0000441    
COAL1     -0.0032113  -0.0054866 
s.e.       0.0008997  0.0011659 
COAL2     -0.0039564  -0.0039031 
s.e.       0.0009198  0.0011152 
PORT       -0.0008946  -0.0012339 
s.e.       0.0003501  0.0004176 
PORTSQ       0.0000519  0.0000701 
s.e.       0.0000172  0.0000206 
UR7781 -0.0004915  -0.0003648  -0.0004353  -0.0000684 -0.0000273 
s.e.  0.0001505 0.0001218 0.0001788 0.0001216 0.0001685 
NFPG7994  -0.1614547  -0.1296449 0.1142153 0.0687244 0.4046884 
s.e.  0.1842812 0.1656065 0.2776958 0.1660468 0.3072756 
SOUTH   0.00000899  0.00000897  
s.e.   0.00000148  0.00000139  
WEST   -0.000000703  -0.000000896  
s.e.   0.00000137  0.00000134  
EUWEST     -0.000000909   -0.00000068 
s.e.     0.00000121  0.00000114 
EUSOUTH     0.000000993   0.00000113 
s.e.     0.000000806  0.000000946 
Parameter estimates shown in italics are not significant at 10% 
 
The evidence amply supports this hypothesis. The only variable reflecting geographical position 
that is significant is south within the country. This is highly significant; and since west is not at 
all significant, we can say that including the 'south within country' variable effectively increases 
the adjusted R
2 from 0.26 to 0.51. The conclusion is that within the EU, only inter-FUR 12 
migration within countries is significant; and even that is restricted compared to the US
9.  Table 
3.2 also shows the effects of including the start of period unemployment rate (a variable included 
in the Glaeser et al 1995 models). While this is significant if only the broad measure of industrial 
structure is included as a control, once the detailed measures of structure are included it ceases to 
be significant. It is therefore dropped from subsequent models. 
 
Table 3.3 : Dependent Variable Population Growth 1979 to 1994: Country Dummies 
compared to Net fertility rates as controls 
 
R² 0.5450  0.5052  0.5648  0.6321 
      
Constant 0.0213986  0.0255701  0.0187674  0.0082421 
s.e.  0.0060631 0.0063797 0.0061624 0.0055608 
LPOP79 -0.0009193  -0.0009414  -0.0007668  -0.0004933 
s.e.  0.0003762 0.0003958 0.0003874 0.0003427 
IND  -0.0001095 -0.00016 -0.0000887   
s.e. 0.0000518  0.0000371  0.0000528   
COAL1       -0.0020092 
s.e.       0.0007538 
COAL2       -0.0037376 
s.e.       0.0010325 
PORT       -0.0007609 
s.e.       0.0002975 
PORTSQ       0.0000414 
s.e.       0.0000146 
UR7781 -0.0003245  -0.0003541  -0.0003078  -0.0001193 
s.e.  0.0001381 0.0001129 0.0001355 0.0001385 
NFPG7994   -0.1452559    
s.e.   0.1584277     
AGR      0.0001037 
s.e.      0.0000558 
POPDEN     -0.00000114 -0.00000093 
s.e.     0.00000065 0.00000052 
SOUTH  0.00000864 0.00000907 0.00000884 0.00000795 
s.e.  0.00000178 0.00000147 0.00000176 0.00000159 
COUNTRY DUMMIES         
Parameter estimates shown in italics are not significant at 10% 
 
Table 3.3 reports the results of two further experiments. It would seem obvious that a control 
should be introduced for background differences in net fertility rates. Two possibilities suggest 
themselves: country dummies and the rate of natural increase in population in the area of each 
country outside the area of its major FURs (NFPG7994). Because of small numbers of 
observations in small countries, these have to be grouped to construct dummies. This grouping 
was based on differences in net fertility rates. In addition there is a very substantial difference in 
net fertility rates between the north and south of Italy so a separate dummy was included for 
                                                 
9 The reasons for the relatively low incidence of inter-regional migration within countries in Europe are likely to 
be various. There is clear evidence that housing market systems restrict mobility both with the higher incidence 
of social housing (Hughes and McCormick, 1981), high transactions costs associated with house sale/purchase, 
rent controls in some countries (e.g. Italy) and planning constraints in land markets causing substantial 
differences in regional elasticity of supply of housing and in house prices. Other factors, such as institutional, 
cultural and linguistic differences are also likely to play a role. 13 
FURs located in the lower birth rate regions of the north of Italy
10. The country dummies are: 
northern Italy; France; the UK and Ireland; Greece, Spain and Portugal; Germany and Denmark; 
and the Benelux countries. A further question is whether city size really has a negative effect on 
urban growth. It would seem more reasonable that quality of life would be decreasing with urban 
density rather than with size. 
 
The country dummies seem to work quite well in terms of the overall R
2 but none are statistically 
significant except in the fourth model in which the more specific measures of industrial structure 
are included; and even in that model the dummies for Denmark, Germany, northern Italy, the UK 
and Ireland are not significant. Indeed in none of the many models fitted was the dummy for 
northern Italy ever remotely significant so it is excluded from the 'best' models reported in Table 
3.4. The background rate of net fertility is not only not significant but has a perverse sign, 
however. Various experiments were conducted with population density and urban size although 
only two are reported in Table 3.3. As expected population density performed better than urban 
size, and always did so when the preferred, more specific measures of industrial structure were 
included, so urban size is dropped from subsequent models. 
 
Table 3.4 presents the result of another two experiments and shows what can be thought of as 
the best models. The theoretical models of urban growth set out in Magrini, 1998
11, predict 
that research and development activity would concentrate spatially and its concentration 
would be associated with rising per capita incomes other things equal. The converse of this 
process was that manufacturing tends to concentrate in the non-R & D specialised regions and 
this concentration would be associated with falling per capita incomes but rising population. 
Thus – if anything – we should expect a negative relationship between specialisation in R & 
D and FUR population growth. This is tested in what appears to be the best model constructed 
and the results are reported in Table 3.4. Secondly although inter country migration may be 
constrained, more local migration is cheaper. In those parts of the EU where urbanisation is 
very dense people may move between FURs in response to changes in the real wage 
(remembering that FURs occupy space so such moves might be very local: from outlying 
parts of the hinterland of one urban region to neighbouring parts of the hinterland of a 
contiguous one with consequent very modest changes in commuting times). Differential 
employment growth in one FUR in such a densely urbanised area may bid up local prices, 
particularly house prices. The resulting reduction in expected real wages may tend to drive out 
residents who substitute longer journeys to work for lower housing costs in neighbouring 
FURs. If this were the case then, with a suitable lag, we should expect a FUR's resident 
population to fall as its employment increased relative to neighbouring FURs other things 
equal. This is tested by constructing a variable – SDGE100 – calculated as the sum of 
differential employment growth between each FUR and all other FURs within 100 minutes 
road time discounted by time distance. To provide a lag the time period chosen is 1979 to 
1987 (data for 1986 not being available – see below). This variable is significant and has the 
expected negative sign. 
 
                                                 
10 The birth rate in Campania is 1.76 times that in Liguria for example. The net effect of this procedure is that the 
five regions of southern Italy act as datum. 
11 It should be noted that this model although broadly neo-classical in spirit, does not require convergence of 
regional per capita incomes. Whether such convergence occurs, or alternatively whether there is divergence, 
depends on the particular values of key parameters. It is argued that non-convergence is the more likely outcome 
in a European context. 14 
The last three columns of this table show the results of controlling for the effects of outliers using 
the procedure available in Stata
12. We do indeed observe a negative relationship between R & D 
specialisation (see Appendix 1 for how this is constructed) and FUR population growth but this 
is only significant in the version of the model which uses the natural rate of increase of 
population in the areas of the country outside the major FURs as the control for background 
population increase. This is now correctly signed and significant. The model with country 
dummies as the control performs slightly better but then although negatively signed the R & D 
variable is non-significant.   
 
Table 3.4: Dependent Variable Population Growth 1979 to 1994: 'Best Models' including R & D 
 
R² 0.6337  0.5932  0.6123  Downweighting  outliers 
        
Constant  0.000633 0.001564 0.001348 0.000673 0.001943  0.001756 
s.e  0.001165 0.001161 0.001118 0.001042 0.001111 0.001069 
COAL1  -0.002448 -0.003084 -0.003036 -0.002621 -0.003101 -0.003019 
s.e  0.000785 0.000911 0.000869 0.000890 0.000963 0.000924 
COAL2  -0.004651 -0.003923 -0.004099 -0.004859 -0.003905 -0.004070 
s.e  0.000994 0.000726 0.000684 0.001197 0.001292 0.001243 
PORT  -0.000924 -0.001003 -0.000886 -0.000805 -0.001159 -0.000796 
s.e  0.000253 0.000302 0.000310 0.000273 0.000595 0.000291 
PORTSQ  0.000049 0.000056 0.000047 0.000043 0.000092  0.000043 
s.e  0.000013 0.000015 0.000016 0.000018 0.000104 0.000019 
AGR  0.000110 0.000108 0.000094 0.000096 0.000090 0.000071 
s.e  0.000048 0.000042 0.000040 0.000042 0.000039 0.000037 
POPDEN  -0.0000008  -0.0000008 -0.0000008 -0.0000007 -0.0000008 -0.0000007 
s.e  0.0000005 0.0000005 0.0000005 0.0000005 0.0000005 0.0000005 
SOUTH  0.000007 0.000009 0.000008 0.000006 0.000008 0.000008 
s.e.  0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 
R&D     -0.000526    -0.000536 
s.e     0.000174    0.000230 
SDGE100 -0.094707  -0.106658  -0.112404  -0.096792 -0.108284 -0.112909 
s.e. 0.043320  0.043065  0.042154  0.052444 0.057701 0.055476 
NFPG7994   0.417870  0.609756   0.347697  0.528789 
s.e   0.189618  0.199173   0.180789  0.190917 
COUNTRY DUMMIES 
(excl. North Italy)           
Parameter estimates shown in italics are not significant at 10% 
 
The authors are not sympathetic to the mechanical elimination of the effects of outliers. These 
contribute to variance and contain information. However, it is reasonable to argue that one 
should test the extent to which results obtained are conditioned on the impact of outliers. 
Calculation of Cook's distance shows that there is essentially only one outlier and that is 
Rotterdam. This, as substantially the largest port in Europe has a noticeable effect on the 
estimated significance of the PORT variable: in particular on the issue of the appropriate 
functional form. Dropping Rotterdam and systematically down weighting values for outliers 
makes it less clear that a quadratic functional form is the most appropriate even though such a 
form has an economic logic and retains its statistical significance when the R & D variable is 
included. Perhaps more interestingly, however, the values of the estimated co-efficients are 
hardly – certainly not significantly – affected.  
 
                                                 
12 All other models were also fitted using this downweighting procedure. This both excludes extreme outliers 
where Cook's Distance >1 and uses Huber and then biweights to downweight remaining outliers. The impact on 
estimated parameters was generally so small that they have not been reported separately. Results are available on 
request from the authors. 15 
4.  Growth in GDP per capita 
 
Although some reasonable models with population growth as the dependent variable can be 
constructed and some hypotheses tested, the overall performance of even the best models is not 
strikingly good. The hypothesis for which the results provide the most powerful supporting 
evidence is with respect to the immobility of labour across the regions of the EU. We see 
significant signs of environmentally driven labour mobility within countries - other factors 
constant - but there is no evidence supporting the conclusion that there is such labour mobility 
across the urban system of the EU as a whole. This strongly supports the presumption that GDP 
p.c. is the more relevant dependent variable if one is to investigate the relative performance of 
urban economies across Europe. It is to this therefore that we now turn.  
 
The data used are derived mainly from Eurostat regional data, accessed via REGIO. Regional 
GDP data have been published for most Level 1, 2 and 3 regions
13 since 1978 although for some 
it is available from 1977. There are however gaps – data for Greek and Portuguese regions for 
example only became available later. In both cases REGIO data have been supplemented with 
national data. For some countries, such as Italy, data for earlier years were only published for 
Level 2 regions. Estimates of GDP p.c. for FURs are derived by using the distribution of FUR 
population between Level 3 regions at the closest Census date as weights and then applying 
those weights to the relevant Level 3 GDP p.c. data. National sources, for example of value 
added in Italy, have been used to disaggregate from Level 2 to Level 3 values where none are 
published by Eurostat.  
 
Despite the work put into cleaning the data and improving the estimates by supplementing 
Eurostat values with national data where appropriate, the FUR level GDP estimates contain 
noise. Estimates for 1978 are inferior to succeeding years. For this reason our preferred approach 
is to use the mean value of three years as start and end dates (although some illustrative results 
for single start and end dates are reported in Appendix Table A3). In passing, we may note that 
there is only a small correlation between population and GDP growth: the R between GDP p.c. 
growth between 1978/80 and 1992/4 (hereafter called 1979-93) and population growth over the 
same period is 0.0879. The strongest correlation is between GDP p.c. growth 1979-93 and 
population growth rate in the previous decade, 1971-81. Even here R is only 0.2257. 
 
In the following discussion we focus on the effects of three main variables. The first is the impact 
of the capacity to generate local growth promotion policies and differential urban performance. 
The second is the role of human capital and R & D in regional growth processes in the EU. The 
third is on the spatial adjustment mechanism between neighbouring urban economies: what we 
call the 'growth shadow effect'.  
 
Local growth promotion policies have been the object of increasing attention in the EU with 
integration and the associated development of territorial competition. To the extent that there is 
an ‘output’ from such policies it is local economic growth and can be viewed as a local quasi-
public good. As was argued above, therefore, there are the usual problems associated with the 
provision of (local) public goods, including a classic problem of spatial spillovers. Whether or 
not such policies are engaged in will be conditioned primarily on the structure of the incentives 
faced by the economic actors who may attempt to form a public/private consortium or ‘growth 
                                                 
13 The EU institutions deal in so-called Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques (N.U.T.S.) regions. 
This is a nesting set of regions based on national territorial divisions. The largest are Level 1 regions; the 
smallest for which a reasonable range of data is available are Level 3. These correspond to Counties in the UK, 
Départements in France; Provincies in Italy or Kreise in Germany. 16 
promotion club’. The expected gross payoff will be a direct function of the additional growth that 
a given club expects it can generate for its members. As was concluded in section 2, for a given 
potential growth gain for an economic region (or FUR) containing the benefits of the growth, the 
expected payoff for a growth club will fall as the spillover losses to areas of the region not 
represented in the club increases. Equally, assuming other factors are constant, the expected net 
payoff would fall as the transactions costs necessarily incurred to form the club increase. The 
most obvious and certain source of spillover losses is to actors within the functional economic 
region but outside the territory covered by the actors within the club. Transactions costs will be 
negatively related to the number of relevant potential members and the institutional dominance 
of the lead actor (assumed to be a governmental unit). Thus expected net benefits will increase 
and costs fall as the size of the governmental unit increases relative to the size of the FUR. 
Arguments such as these led Cheshire and Gordon (1996, page 389) to conclude that growth 
promotion policies would be more likely to appear and be more energetically pursued where 
'there are a smaller number of public agencies representing the functional economic region, with 
the boundaries of the highest tier authority approximating to those of the region…' 
 
It is possible to specify a variable closely reflecting this feature of FURs. This is ratio of the total 
population of the largest (relevant) unit of government representing the FUR to the population of 
the FUR as a whole. Since transactions costs will fall both with the dominance of the lead actor 
and the number of actors/local governments that have to combine we could add that we are 
implicitly assuming that the relative size of the largest government unit is also a proxy for 
leadership capacity. We are implicitly assuming this will be the governmental unit with the 
largest population but this is qualified by 'relevant': by which we mean that the governmental 
unit concerned must have significant powers of action. Even though it might be the largest 
N.U.T.S. region with a territory overlapping that of the London FUR, for example, the South 
East Region would not have been a 'relevant' governmental unit because it had essentially no 
powers
14.   
 
We call this the policy units variable and it is designed to measure the capacity to prosecute 
policies promoting growth at the FUR level
15. In identifying the largest 'relevant' unit of 
government representing the FUR, 'relevant' is defined as a sub-national unit of government 
with an administrative area encompassing or corresponding to (some proportion of) the 
territory of a FUR and which has significant administrative and decision-making powers. 
Since the largest 'relevant' unit was selected it was also in all cases the highest tier of sub-
national government relating to the territory of the FUR. Since one criterion was that the unit 
of government selected should have significant administrative and decision making powers 
the Level 1 regions were potentially available for selection in European countries with a 
regional level of government. This means that the value of the variable can range from only 
about 0.125 to over 2. We might further hypothesise that if the value of the variable were very 
high, so that the size of the ‘relevant’ unit of government considerably exceeded the size of 
the FUR, then the capacity to generate local growth promoting policies would weaken. This is 
because the interests of the FUR would begin to be lost in those of the larger unit which might 
pursue policies favouring rural areas or smaller centres. If this were the case then we would 
expect to observe a quadratic functional form with a maximum positive impact where the 
value of the policy units variable was between 1 and 2.  
                                                 
14 During the period analysed there was a South East Regional Planning Council (SERPLAN) but this was 
effectively no more than a forum for discussion. 
15 Implicitly we assume FURs – since they are self contained and therefore minimise spillover losses of growth 
to other territories in an integrated spatial economy – approximate the most appropriate territorial units at which 
to pursue local growth promotion policies. 17 
 
Since the structure of government powers and local government structure vary from country 
to country within the EU the rules for identifying the largest 'relevant' unit of government 
associated with each FUR, while explicit and decided blind of the data, had to vary from 
country to country. The ‘rules’ used are set out in the Appendix 1. 
 
Table 4.1: Dependent Variable Annualised Rate of Growth of GDP p.c. Mean 1978/80 to 
mean 1992/4: Basic Model  
Model  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
R
2  0.1514 0.3817 0.3670 0.3988 0.5471 0.5767 0.5852 
         
Constant 0.076955 0.087126  0.068073 0.062490 0.011706 0.006685 0.004766
s.e  0.025996 0.025225 0.020158 0.020822 0.018326 0.017005 0.017682
LGDP79A -0.007257 -0.008481  -0.005832 -0.005395 -0.002486 -0.002086 -0.002024
s.e.  0.003293 0.003046 0.002359 0.002414 0.001985 0.001928 0.001996
LPOP79  0.003490 0.003396 0.003411 0.003416 0.001921 0.001936 0.001876
s.e  0.000763 0.000699 0.000723 0.000734 0.000573 0.000538 0.000535
IND  0.000005 0.000121       
s.e  0.000076 0.000081       
COAL1    -0.007831 -0.006896 -0.007499 -0.007034 -0.007614 -0.007561
s.e    0.001423 0.001251 0.001262 0.001058 0.001066 0.001073
COAL2    -0.007087 -0.006300 -0.005826 -0.006698 -0.006239 -0.006052
s.e.    0.001516 0.001351 0.001358 0.001457 0.001511 0.001594
PORT    -0.001384 -0.001546 -0.001600 -0.001444 -0.001497 -0.001514
s.e    0.000581 0.000566 0.000567 0.000443 0.000440 0.000446
PORTSQ    0.000056 0.000060 0.000064 0.000063 0.000067 0.000069
s.e    0.000028 0.000028 0.000028 0.000022 0.000022 0.000022
PU       0.003467  0.003339  0.008259
s.e       0.001389  0.001204  0.003179
PUSQ        -0.002429
s.e.         0.001305
NFG7993A       0.757989 0.753200  0.763857
s.e       0.085277 0.082618  0.085022
Parameter estimates shown in italics are not significant at 10% 
 
The results of a simple model are reported in Table 4.1. The same control variables are used for 
industrial structure as were used in the models in which population growth was the dependent 
variables. The results for these are essentially the same. The more detailed measures relating to 
old resource based industries work best. The broader measure of specialisation in aggregated 
industrial sectors in the wider Level 2 region in 1975 is dropped from subsequent models. 
 
The log of population size is included with the expectation that larger cities will have grown 
faster in terms of GDP p.c. because of productivity gains in larger urban areas (see Costa and 
Kahn, 2000 for a convincing account of at least one important source of such productivity gains 
in larger cities). A measure of the ‘background’ rate of economic growth, NFG7993A, the rate of 
growth of GDP p.c. in the area of each country outside the major FURs, is included. As would be 
expected this is highly significant. It controls for institutional, policy and other factors which 
may have led to countries having differences in their growth rates over a given period and which 
relate to their whole territory. The variable should also effectively control for national differences 
in the incidence of the economic cycle. This may explain why it is so significant. Adding the 
variable increases the R
2 from about 0.4 to 0.55. Although national dummies have been the way 18 
in which this problem has been handled in the literature it seems more elegant and powerful to 
use the continuous variable employed here. As can be seen the results are strong and significant. 
Also, interestingly, it eliminates the significance of LGDP79A, the initial level of GDP p.c. 
Previous work has shown that both the significance and even sign of this commonly used 
variable were highly dependent on model specification (Cheshire and Carbonaro, 1995) and this 
confirms that result. It suggests that there is more variance in FUR growth rates across countries 
than within them and that the initial level of GDP p.c. acts in large measure as a national dummy. 
Given the ambiguity of our preferred theoretical model of urban growth in the EU with respect to 
the issue of convergence (Magrini, 1998) the initial level of GDP p.c. is omitted from later 
models although its inclusion has no noticeable effect on estimated parameter values for other 
variables. 
 
Table 4.2: Dependent Variable Annualised Rate of Growth of GDP p.c. Mean 1978/80 to 
Mean 1992/4: Including Policy & Human Capital Variables 
 
Model 8  9  10  11  12 
R²  0.6180 0.6298 0.6718 0.6767 0.6955 
       
Constant  -0.009130 -0.018284 -0.023042 -0.031480 -0.001745 
s.e  0.024740 0.025048 0.022007 0.023857 0.025912 
LGDP79A  -0.001312 -0.000604 -0.000856 -0.000054 -0.003920 
s.e  0.002544 0.002552 0.002248 0.002451 0.002841 
LPOP79  0.001968 0.002104 0.002145 0.002115 0.002237 
s.e  0.000506 0.000489 0.000484 0.000475 0.000462 
COAL1  -0.006266 -0.005869 -0.006396 -0.006202 -0.006174 
s.e.  0.001184 0.001143 0.001083 0.001079 0.001059 
COAL2  -0.005321 -0.005036 -0.004431 -0.004169 -0.005140 
s.e  0.001733 0.001742 0.001734 0.001815 0.002075 
PORT  -0.001342 -0.001407 -0.001429 -0.001468 -0.001329 
s.e  0.000444 0.000437 0.000454 0.000460 0.000405 
PORTSQ  0.000062 0.000066 0.000074 0.000076 0.000063 
s.e  0.000022 0.000022 0.000023 0.000023 0.000021 
AGR  0.000473 0.000417 0.000457 0.000507 0.000538 
s.e  0.000149 0.000151 0.000147 0.000148 0.000148 
AGRSQ  -0.000013 -0.000012 -0.000013 -0.000013 -0.000013 
s.e  0.000004 0.000004 0.000004 0.000004 0.000003 
PU  0.009188 0.009231 0.003299 0.007503 0.009739 
s.e  0.003287 0.003280 0.001027 0.003581 0.003617 
PUSQ -0.002971  -0.003036    -0.002085  -0.002717 
s.e. 0.001426  0.001413    0.001543  0.001536 
NFG7993A  0.819452 0.850136 0.941290 0.944089 0.923894 
s.e  0.087022 0.089180 0.102830 0.104959 0.097029 
POPDEN    -0.000001 -0.000002 -0.000002 -0.000002 
s.e   0.0000004  0.000001  0.000001  0.000001 
UNSTUD     0.000036  0.000031  0.000030 
s.e     0.000013  0.000014  0.000014 
R&D     0.000761  0.000804  0.000958 
s.e     0.000224  0.000221  0.000221 
CEP       0.004174 
s.e       0.001638 
Parameter estimates shown in italics are not significant at 10% 
 
The results for the policy units variable, included in models 4, 6 and 7, are also significant 
although the evidence for a quadratic functional form appears inconclusive. Table 4.2 reports the 
results of adding additional variables: initial population density; agricultural specialisation in the 
wider Level 2 region; the R & D and human capital variables; and a variable intended to capture 19 
the direct spatial impacts of European integration. Population density is included since, other 
things equal, cities with higher density will have higher rents and greater congestion. A negative 
relationship is expected. The R & D and university students per employee variables are included 
to test for the influence of highly skilled human capital and specialisation in R & D following 
Romer, 1990 as adapted to a spatial context by, for example, Cheshire and Carbonaro, 1995; 
1996 and Magrini, 1998. 
 
The overall performance of the model improves and all variables are significant, with the human 
capital variables having a strong and positive association with growth in GDP p.c. compared to 
the weakly negative association with population growth. The policy units results are re-inforced 
in the more completely specified model although still the evidence for a quadratic functional 
form is not conclusive. 
 
At least since the 1960s there have been arguments that (European) integration would have 
systematic spatial effects, economically favouring core regions. An early empirical attempt to 
quantify such effects was embodied in the work of Clark et al (1969). More recently 
theoretical work by Krugman and Venables has produced more formal arguments with 
essentially the same conclusions (see Fujita et al 1999 for an up to date survey). The Change 
in Economic Potential (CEP) variable, selected to measure the direct spatial impacts of 
European integration, is calculated from the work of Clark et al (1969) supplemented with the 
estimates for the regions of Spain and Portugal provided by Keeble et al (1988) and scaled to 
Clark et al’s values. Values for Athens, Lisboa, Porto and Saliniki have been interpolated to 
provide coverage of all the regions of the EU of 12. Since our interest is in growth we have 
calculated the change in the values of 'economic potential'
16 from the pre-Treaty of Rome 
values to those estimated as being associated with an elimination of tariffs, the EU’s 
enlargement of the 1980s and a reduction in transport costs following the introduction of roll-
on roll-off ferries and containerisation.  
 
The theoretical arguments as to why integration should favour core regions do not imply that the 
relationship measured for the 1980s or the 1990s should necessarily be linear with respect to the 
variable used here.  Clark's calculations are for different hypothetical states of the world but with 
regional GDP data estimated for and fixed at 1966.  Any differential spatial growth induced by 
integration might have been fastest where economic potential increased most in the initial stages.  
But such growth would tend to bid up local factor costs and produce additional congestion, other 
things equal.  In turn, this would tend with a fixed and single integration shock to produce 
deconcentration over time from the core to surrounding regions. Therefore, in the absence of 
further integration shocks, by the 1980s the relationship between differential urban growth and 
Clark et al's (1969) estimates of the change in economic potential might be expected to be 
quadratic. The greatest gains would no longer have been in the core regions but in the outer 
core/near periphery.  The introduction of the Single European Market and then of monetary 
union might be expected to have provided new integration shocks, however, and so have given 
additional impetus to the spatial impact of European integration. Thus with the extension of the 
observations into the 1990s there might be a reinforcing of the influence of the change in 
economic potential on FUR growth. Such an increase in the influence of European integration on 
local growth would be reflected in an increased significance of the estimated co-efficient of the 
change in economic potential variable and a reversion to a linear functional form. This would 
reflect a re-concentration of the strongest impact in the inner core regions. This is exactly the 
result reported in model 12 where the variable is significant and the functional form linear 
                                                 
16 Economic potential is a measure of the accessibility at any point to total GDP allowing for costs of distance 
including tariffs. For further discussion see Clark et al 1968  20 
(compared to the results reported in Cheshire and Carbonaro, 1996, using data to 1990 in which 
the functional form was quadratic and the variable only weakly significant). 
 
As has already been shown, labour mobility in the EU - as migration - appears to be very 
restricted between countries and restricted between FURs within the same country. However, as 
was also discussed above, there are alternative forms of labour mobility, likely to be particularly 
important in Europe, because of both the dense nature of urbanisation and the relatively effective 
transport systems and the long distance commuting these render feasible. In the EU, there are 
swathes of densely urbanised territory where FURs are not just tightly clustered but their 
boundaries are contiguous. In such conditions, if the relative economic attractions of a FUR 
increase relative to its neighbours it will attract in additional commuters; or, as was suggested by 
the evidence reported in section 3, if consumer prices – notably house prices – fall relative to 
those in neighbouring FURs it would attract additional residents. Since changes in commuting 
patterns are cheap relative to migration, the major adjustment mechanism would be expected to 
be changes in the former in response to changes in the spatial distribution of economic 
opportunities between neighbouring FURs.  This assumes that conditions influencing the quality 
of life are constant over time between neighbouring FURs. 
 
If commuting patterns act in this way as spatial adjustment mechanisms between neighbouring 
FURs then we should expect a ‘growth shadow effect’. A FUR will grow faster the closer it is to 
other more slowly growing FURs: and vice versa. This may arise for three separate reasons. The 
least interesting is simply one of measurement. Since GDP is measured at workplace and people 
are counted where they live if output expands but resident population does not there will be a 
spurious apparent increase in the GDP p.c. of the resident population (FUR boundaries are fixed 
as at 1971 commuting patterns). Since long distance commuters (and perhaps those reacting to 
changes in the pattern of spatial economic opportunities) have higher human capital and perhaps 
favourable unmeasured productivity characteristics then there would also be a composition 
effect. The productivity of the labour force of the FUR attracting additional commuters would 
grow relative to that of its neighbours. Finally, there might also be dynamic agglomeration 
effects favouring productivity growth in the faster growing FUR.
17 
 
This is tested by means of two variables. SDG 100A is calculated as the sum of the differences in 
the growth rate of GDP p.c. in a FUR and those of all other FURs within 100 minutes divided by 
distance over the period 1979 to 1986. One would expect commuting patterns to adjust with a lag 
to changes in the pattern of opportunities between neighbouring FURs but calculating the 
variable this way has the additional benefit of reducing the likelihood of endogeneity problems. 
Since the sum of growth differences is divided by distance and only calculated for FURs within 
100 minutes travel time of each other, for many FURs its value is zero. As the correlation matrix 
in Appendix 2 shows the simple correlation between the SDG 100A variable and the FUR’s 
growth over the whole period is small. However, since there might still be concerns with 
endogeneity a second variable based on growth in employment is also constructed. This is 
SDGE100: the sum of the difference in the growth rate of employment in a FUR and 
employment growth rates of FURs within 100 minutes divided by distance calculated over 1979 
to 1987 (there are gaps in 1986 regional employment data). The results are reported in Tables 4.3 
                                                 
17 In an ESRC Cities Initiative project, we addressed these issues directly.  The growth shadow effect was 
significant whether the dependent variable was growth in GDP p.c. or growth in output per employee. This 
showed that there were significant effects independent of any purely statistical measurement issue. In addition, 
changes in commuter flows between a set of 114 EU FURs with cores within 100 minutes travel distance were 
modelled. It was found that with appropriate lags inward commuting increased as GDP p.c. increased in a FUR, 
outward commuting increased as unemployment increased in any FUR and the responsiveness of all inter FUR 
commuting to changes in economic variables declined with time-distance (Cheshire et al 2001) 21 
and 4.4. It will be seen that the pattern of results and co-efficient estimates is very similar but that 
the variable constructed from GDP data is more significant. In the models in Table 4.3, a dummy 
variable for FURs in northeastern Italy is also included. This is significant but does not change 
the essential behaviour of the model nor the parameter values. It is included on the well worn 
argument that there are ‘two Italies’ so that the simple growth in the whole territory of the 
country outside its major FURs (NFG7993A) does not capture the north-south Italy distinction. 
 
Table 4.3: Dependent Variable Annualised Rate of Growth of GDP p.c. Mean 1978/80 to 
Mean 1992/4: +Policy, H-C, Spatial Interaction & N. Italy Dummy 
  
Model 13  14  15 
R² 0.7514  0.7900  0.7993 
      
Constant  0.004142 0.016189 0.007947 
s.e 0.028026  0.024205  0.024905 
LGDP79A  -0.003625  -0.005347 -0.004668 
s.e 0.002993  0.002697  0.002763 
LPOP79 0.002127  0.002212  0.002172 
s.e 0.000521  0.000446  0.000432 
COAL1 -0.005255  -0.006067  -0.005795 
s.e. 0.000949  0.000910  0.000868 
COAL2 -0.003166  -0.003279  -0.002989 
s.e 0.001146  0.001229  0.001284 
PORT -0.000961  -0.000977  -0.001006 
s.e 0.000376  0.000332  0.000326 
PORTSQ 0.000050  0.000049  0.000050 
s.e 0.000020  0.000017  0.000017 
PU   0.004071  0.010052 
s.e   0.001007  0.002980 
PUSQ     -0.002918 
s.e     0.001236 
NFG7993A 0.922725  0.900816  0.903705 
s.e 0.094462  0.079173  0.079088 
AGR 0.000304  0.000300  0.000372 
s.e 0.000136  0.000127  0.000128 
AGRSQ -0.000009  -0.000009  -0.000009 
s.e 0.000003  0.000003  0.000003 
POPDEN -0.000002  -0.000002  -0.000002 
s.e 0.0000004  0.0000004  0.0000004 
UNSTUD 0.000037  0.000037  0.000030 
s.e 0.000010  0.000009  0.000010 
R&D 0.000567  0.000693  0.000768 
s.e 0.000218  0.000188  0.000188 
CEP  0.001410  0.003384 0.003837 
s.e 0.001562  0.001468  0.001438 
SDG100A 0.242806  0.236205  0.241621 
s.e 0.041552  0.036762  0.037471 
DNEI 0.007570  0.007813  0.007582 
s.e 0.001146  0.001223  0.001636 
Parameter estimates shown in italics are not significant at 10% 
 
 
The extra variables improve the overall fit and performance of the models. All variables are 
significant including the quadratic term in the policy units variable. When the policy units 
variable is included the change in economic potential variable is linear and significant suggesting 
that other factors constant FURs in the core of the EU grew most over the period. Both the 
human capital variables are significant and positive and there is strong evidence for a ‘growth 22 
shadow’ effect in Europe. This remains whether the interaction incentive is measured in terms of 
the sum of lagged differential growth discounted by distance or as the sum of lagged differential 
employment growth discounted by distance (Table 4.4).
18  
 
Table 4.4: Dependent Variable Annualised Rate of Growth of GDP p.c. Mean 1978/80 to 
Mean 1992/4:  Alternative Spatial Interaction & South within country 
 
Model  16 17 18 19 20  Downweighting 
outliers  
R²  0.7025 0.7648 0.7760 0.7150 0.6995   
         
Constant  -0.036499 -0.033074 -0.030480 -0.033716 0.0221635  -0.0333814 
s.e  0.008028 0.008203 0.008052 0.007875  0.0074172  0.0094239 
LPOP79  0.002017 0.001770 0.001736 0.001977  0.0017181  0.002123 
s.e  0.000459 0.000450 0.000451 0.000462  0.0004867  0.0005834 
COAL1  -0.005468 -0.005527 -0.006028 -0.005994  -0.0057963  -0.0058931 
s.e.  0.000933 0.000873 0.000925 0.001019  .00011148  0.001215 
COAL2  -0.003341 -0.002427 -0.002439 -0.003331 -0.003476  -0.0034801 
s.e  0.001581 0.001155 0.001185 0.001517  0.0016642  0.0016668 
PORT  -0.001334 -0.001038 -0.001111 -0.001408  -0.0014795  -0.0024733 
s.e  0.000387 0.000329 0.000332 0.000390  0.0003719  0.0007893 
PORTSQ  0.000068 0.000055 0.000058 0.000071  0.0000724  0.0002678 
s.e  0.000020 0.000017 0.000017 0.000020  0.0000194  0.0001366 
PU  0.010790 0.010910 0.010109 0.009949  0.0084165  0.0113432 
s.e  0.003443 0.003079 0.003038 0.003411  0.0035211  0.0035203 
PUSQ  -0.003366 -0.003528 -0.003303 -0.003132  -0.0022328  -0.0037341 
s.e  0.001426 0.001248 0.001235 0.001422  0.0014647  0.001609 
NFG7993A  0.968474 0.981087 0.953948 0.939837    0.8999815 
s.e  0.098714 0.096301 0.091396 0.093287    0.1007857 
AGR  0.000612 0.000518 0.000548 0.000643  0.00054  0.00067 
s.e  0.000142 0.000129 0.000133 0.000145  0.0001693  0.000159 
AGRSQ  -0.000014 -0.000012 -0.000012 -0.000015  -0.0000143  -0.000015 
s.e  0.000003 0.000003 0.000003 0.000004  0.0000045 0.00000041 
POPDEN  -0.000002 -0.000002 -0.000002 -0.000002 -0.000002  -0.0000072 
s.e 0.000001  0.0000004 0.0000004 0.000001  0.0000008  0.0000007 
UNSTUD  0.000027 0.000029 0.000031 0.000030  0.0000304  0.000023 
s.e  0.000014 0.000013 0.000012 0.000014  0.0000145  0.0000115 
R&D  0.000985 0.000862 0.000777 0.000895  0.0006757  0.0009891 
s.e  0.000219 0.000208 0.000195 0.000215 0.000267  0.0002922 
CEP  0.003180 0.002656 0.002533 0.003048  0.0032621  0.0029964 
s.e  0.001345 0.001212 0.001240 0.001369  0.0023522  0.0013884 
SDGE100  0.154950    0.155433  0.167448  0.1473923 
s.e  0.081269    0.078228  0.0792688  0.0728706 
SDG100A   0.254774  0.252569      
s.e   0.040537  0.040639      
SOUTH     -0.000003  -0.000003  -1.07
e-0  -0.000003 
s.e.     0.000002  0.000002  0.0000022  0.00000159 
COUNTRY DUMMIES          
Parameter estimates shown in italics are not significant at 10% 
                                                 
18 We experimented with alternative distance cut-offs and measuring in terms of kms rather than road time. The 
version reported here performed best. A final experiment is the inclusion of the South within country variable used in the population 
growth models. This is only significant in models where the growth shadow effect is formulated 
using the sum of lagged differential GDP growth discounted by distance. However, it is always 
estimated with a negative sign. This is consistent with population growth responding to 
environmental or quality of life factors being self-selective for unmeasured negative productivity 
differences. People choosing sunshine over income tend to be less productive in other words. 
 
Table 4.4 reports two further sets of results in what we regard as the best models. These use the 
sum of differential employment growth to capture the growth shadow effect. The first 
experiment is to substitute country dummies for the growth in national remainders variable. The 
second provides tests for the sensitivity of model 19 to the effects of outliers. 
 
As expected the cruder country dummies perform significantly less well than the continuous 
variable: growth in the national territory outside the area of its major FURs (NFG7993A). Not 
only is this an interesting result in its own right, since country dummies are so widely used, but it 
is also interesting how, as the models become more fully specified the estimated parameter 
associated with NFG7993A gets closer to 1. In the simplest model for which we report results 
the estimated parameter is only 0.76 whereas in the more fully specified models reported in 
Tables 4.3 or 4.4 the estimate ranges from 0.9 to 0.98. 
 
The final column of Table 4.4 reports the results obtained using the routine available in Stata to 
offset for the effects of outliers. We can see that as expected the only parameter estimate 
significantly conditioned by outliers is the functional form for the PORT variable. Dropping the 
observation for Rotterdam and systematically down weighting outliers renders the quadratic 
form only marginally significant. Overall the performance of the model hardly changes, 
however, and the significance of the policy units variable increases. The results reported in Table 
4.4 for this procedure are typical of other models.  In addition, tests have been performed for 
spatial autocorrelation. These revealed no problems once non-FUR growth and the spatial 
interaction variables (whether SDGE100 or SDG100A) were included in the model
19. A final 
test was to fit the model on growth rates calculated from single start and end dates. The results 
are reported in Appendix Table A3. As expected – since there is more noise in the data – the 
model does not fit as well and the standard errors associated with the parameter estimates 
increase but the main results are very similar. The functional form for the policy unit variable 
ceases to be significantly quadratic (although the estimated values are neither significantly nor 
substantially different.) The only other variable affected is that for university students per 
employee. The parameter estimate is effectively unchanged but the variable ceases to be 




This paper tests a series of propositions relating to the European spatial economy and 
particularly to the mechanisms of adjustment within it (implicitly contrasted with those in the 
US). It investigates what makes it tick and also what impact variation in the arrangements for 
urban government may have on urban growth performance. Policies that encourage local 
economic growth can be seen as the provision of a local public. Conditions increasingly 
favour the development of growth promoting clubs, therefore, as spillover losses and 
transactions costs fall. The policy units variable, measured as ratio of the size of the largest 
                                                 
19 Other results downweighting outliers and those for the spatial autocorrelation tests are available from the 
authors. 24 
governmental unit to that of the economic region (FUR) is designed to reflect this capacity to 
develop local growth promotion clubs and produces statistically powerful results. 
 
Policies encouraging local economic growth are not here conceived of as being particularly 
concerned with inward investment nor even, necessarily, with explicitly promoting growth at 
all. They may consist mainly of efficient local public administration, the avoidance of waste 
and a focus on activities that government at an urban level can effectively influence such as 
the supply of skills or infrastructure planning rather than redistribution. It is not possible to 
measure these comparably across the urban areas of the EU as a whole. Indeed, it is difficult 
to think of any general direct quantitative indicator. Work in the US, for example Rappaport 
1999, has used measures of individual policies, such as expenditures on elementary and 
secondary school education. The variable used in the present paper seems justified on 
theoretical grounds (see section 2) but is an indirect measure designed to measure not the 
policies themselves but the capacity of an urban government to generate such policies. There 
is a strong positive association between this variable and economic growth performance in the 
functional urban region concerned. This is apparent even in a very simple model but more 
fully specified models confirm its statistical significance and provide evidence of a quadratic 
functional form. This suggests that if the government unit is too large relative to the 
functional urban region concerned the interests of the FUR may tend to get lost in those of the 
larger region. 
 
The results also offer strong support for the view that one size does not fit all. Models, which 
may be appropriate for US conditions, are not necessarily appropriate for conditions in 
Western Europe. The evidence is that labour migration – despite European integration – is 
very imperfect as an adjustment mechanism across the urban system of the EU as a whole. 
There is evidence consistent with migration between cities within countries having some 
equilibrating role in terms of real wages; but no evidence for it playing such a role across 
Europe as a whole. One conclusion from this is that income growth rather than population 
growth is a more appropriate indicator of improvements in welfare in a city. There is however 
evidence that commuting flows do play a significant role in Europe in spatial adjustment. We 
observe a significant 'growth shadow' effect with cities in contiguously urbanised regions 
(such as most of the Benelux countries or large areas of Germany, northern Italy or England) 
growing faster the closer they are to other less rapidly growing cities. This seems to reflect 
adjustment in commuting patterns to take advantage of changing patterns of spatial economic 
opportunity. There are even indications that in the faster growing cities (where, by 
implication, costs of living are rising) there is some local migration outwards to the 
surrounding cities.  
 
The empirical results also provide support for the theoretical work of Magrini (1997; 1998) on 
the role of human capital in regional growth and its interaction with the effects of integration. In 
this, a plausible outcome of the process of European integration is that regional economic growth 
diverges and the disparities in per capita income increase rather than converge. Integration 
similar to that which has characterised recent European history is seen as a possible cause for the 
emergence of a new steady-state equilibrium characterised by a further concentration of research 
activities in the regions which were already relatively specialised in research. While the 
adjustment takes place through the reallocation of unskilled labour and human capital, the 
average per capita income in the more innovative, relatively research-intensive region(s) grows 
at a faster rate than in the other region(s). At the same time 'unskilled' labour (and population) 
increases in the non-research specialised regions. This leads to a new steady-state distribution of 
per capita income characterised by an increase in disparities. 
 25 
The significant association found between measures of human capital intensity and R & D is also 
consistent with recent empirical work on the migration patterns of university students
20. This 
finds that while students are drawn from catchment areas which are more extensive the higher 
the research reputation of the university concerned, students also had a predictable propensity to 
move into the labour markets local to their universities. The proportion of graduates entering the 
labour market hosting their university was a function of the dynamism and structure of the local 
economy. Together with the results in this paper, this suggests that the role of universities is not 
just to generate a supply of highly qualified human capital for their host economies but also 
differentially to attract those with the potential to acquire high levels of human capital. Such 
explanations are not mutually exclusive nor do they imply that there is not a direct generation of 
applicable knowledge in universities favouring local application as found, for example, by 
Audretsch and Feldman, 1996.  
 
Table 5.1:Impact on growth of moving from 1st to 3rd quartile* 
 
*Impact calculated from Model 19 Table 4.4 
 
Table 5.1 shows some calculations to illustrate the impact of three key variables on urban growth 
rates. In each case, we consider the impact on estimated growth associated with the value of the 
independent variables identified in the first column increased from that of the first to the third 
quartile observed in the distribution. The second column shows the absolute impact, the second 
the percentage impact if the FUR in question had a growth rate equal to that of the mean and the 
last column if its growth rate was equal to that of the first quartile of the distribution. As can be 
seen the impacts are small but not trivial. For a slow growing FUR increasing the value of the 
policy units variable from the value of the first to third quartiles was associated with a 3.1 
percent increase in its average growth rate. 
 
The results do not identify a policy lever one could pull to change the outcomes observed. It does 
not follow, for example, that if every city were given the same proportion of university students 
per employee they would all have grown at the same rate as the actually best endowed with 
universities did. While true that the differences in endowment with universities was one factor in 
explaining growth differences - and that helps understand what was going on - there is no 
necessary symmetry about the impact of giving all cities the same sized relative university 
sectors. The unobserved characteristics of the cities with the highest ratios of university students 
probably were, and still are, different in important ways from cities with the lowest ratios; and 
were not independent of the concentration of universities in them. Nor is it possible to think in 
practical terms of providing all cities with equally high ratios of university students per total 
employee and maintaining a constant quality of university students (and students who then 
disproportionately join the local labour force).  
 
It is much more plausible to think of the findings on the policy units variable as identifying a 
‘policy lever’. Local and regional government boundaries and functions could be restructured 
and, if an important element of the disadvantage FURs with fragmented local government 
structures face results from the problems of spillovers and transaction costs entailed in 
                                                 
20 See McCann and Sheppard (1999) and Sheppard and McCann (2000). 
Dependent Variable 
Absolute change in 
growth rate 
% Change relative to 
mean growth rate 
% Change relative to 1
st 
Quartile growth rate 
PU 0.00176  2.9  3.1 
PU+UNSTUD+R&D 0.00464  7.6 8.2 26 
forming effective growth clubs, the outcome should be more effective growth policies all 
round. A problem is that, of course, ‘effective’ local growth promotion policies at present, in 
circumstances in which not all city regions are equally well endowed with the capacity to 
develop them, may be significantly competitive and diversionary. Some local growth may be 
zero sum. The success of the successful may significantly be a function of the poor 
performance of the unsuccessful. As is argued in Cheshire and Gordon (1998), however, it 
does not follow that all policies designed to promote local growth are zero sum. It is 
reasonable to expect that there could be net efficiency gains for the EU's urban system as a 
whole if government boundaries – at least for the highest strategic tiers of local government – 
were aligned more closely with those reflecting economically relevant patterns of behaviour 
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Appendix 1: Variable Definitions and data 
Table A1: In Population models the dependent variable was in all cases the annualised rate of FUR 
population growth between 1979 and 1994. All GDP growth models used as the dependent variable the 
annualised rate of FUR growth in GDP p.c. converted at OECD PPS. Growth measured either between 
means of 1978/80 and 1992/94 or between 1979 and 1994 
 
LPOP79 
Total population in the FUR in 1979: estimated by applying Level 3 population growth rates 
between the nearest Census year and 1979 weighted by the actual distribution of population 
between Level 3 regions from national population Censuses 
POPDEN  Density of population in FUR in 1979 
IND  Percentage of labour force in industry in surrounding level 2 region in 1975: source Eurostat
COAL1   A dummy=1 if the core of the FUR is located within a coalfield 
COAL2  A dummy=1 if the hinterland of the FUR is located within a coalfield 
PORT  Volume of port trade in 1969 in tons 
PORTSQ  Volume of port trade in 1969 in tons squared 
AGR  Percentage of labour force in agriculture in surrounding Level 2 region in 1975 
WEST  Distance west of centre of FUR from national capital city (Amsterdam taken as capital of 
Netherlands; Bonn of Germany) 
SOUTH  Distance south of centre of FUR from national capital city (Amsterdam taken as capital of 
Netherlands; Bonn of Germany) 
EUWEST  Distance west of centre of FUR from Bruxelles/Brussel 
EUSOUTH  Distance south of centre of FUR from Bruxelles/Brussel 
NFPG7994  Annualised rate of growth of population in territory of country outside major FURs between 
1979 and 1994 
UR7781  Unemployment rate in FUR: mean of 1977 to 1981: Eurostat Level 3 data weighted by 
distribution of FUR populations 
DBENL  Dummy for Belgium and Dutch FURs 
DDEDK  Dummy for German and Danish FURs 
DUKIE  Dummy for British and Irish FURs 
DFR  Dummy for French FURs 
DESPTGR  Dummy for Spanish, Portuguese and Greek FURs 
DNIT  Dummy for Northern Italian FURs: 'northern' determined by regional fertility rates. Thus 
southern Italian FURs act as datum in models including country dummies 
LGDP79A 
FUR GDP p.c. at PPS mean 1978/80: estimated using FUR distribution of population for 
nearest Census year between Level 3 regions applied to Eurostat Level 3 GDP supplemented 
by national data (see text)  
NFG7993A/ 
NFG7994 
Annualised growth rate of non-FUR GDP p.c. between the means of 1978/80 and 1992/4 (or 
1979 to 1994 where dependent variable is single start and end date) 
CEP 
Change in economic potential for FUR resulting from movement from individual nation-
states to post enlargement EU with reduced transport costs (estimated from Clark et al 1969 
and Keeble et al 1988) 
PU  Policy Units (see text) but measured as the ratio of the FUR population in 1981 to the 
population of the largest governmental unit associated with the FUR. 
PUSQ  Policy units squared 
R_D  R & D Laboratories of Fortune top 500 companies per million population – 1980 
SDG100A  Sum of difference in growth rate of GDP p.c. in a FUR and growth rates of FURs within 100 
minutes divided by distance. Growth rates for 1979 to 1986 
SDGE 100  Sum of difference in growth rate of employment in FUR and employment growth rates of 
FURs within 100 minutes divided by distance. Growth rates for 1979 to 1987 
DNEI  Dummy for FURs of North East Italy: Padua, Verona and Venice 
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To estimate the Policy Units variable the rules determining the selection of the largest 
'relevant' governmental unit were: 
Belgium  The central communes for all except Bruxelles for which the capital 
region (Arrondissement) was taken; 
Denmark Central  Municipality; 
Germany  The Kreisfreie Stadte except for Bremen and Hamburg where the Land 
(a NUTS 1 region) was taken and Frankfurt where the Umlandverband 
was taken; 
France  Since there is a NUTS 1 region, the Ile de France, which has significant 
powers, was selected for Paris. Elsewhere in France the central 
Commune was selected except for those FURs for which a Communité 
Urbaine exists; in those cases the Communité Urbaine was selected 
Greece  The central Municipality; 
Ireland  The County Borough (of Dublin); 
Italy  The central Commune was selected in all cases. Unlike the situation in 
France (Paris) or Germany (Bremen and Hamburg) there is no NUTS 1 
or 2 region corresponding to any city nor is there any city with a city 
wide tier of government (such as the Communité Urbaine). 
The Netherlands  The central Municipality (as Italy); 
Portugal  The central Municipality (as Italy); 
Spain  Where there was one major FUR in a Communidad Autonoma (a 
NUTS 2 region), the Communidad Autonoma was selected; where there 
was more than one major FUR in the Communidad Autonoma but only 
one in the Provincia (a NUTS 3 region), the Provincia was selected; 
where there was more than one major FUR within a Provincia then the 
central Municipio was selected; 
United Kingdom  In England, the District was selected except in London where Inner 
London was used; in Scotland, the regions of Lothian and Strathclyde 
were taken and for Belfast the NUTS 1 region of Northern Ireland was 
the government unit identified. 
 
The only case, then, for which no obvious rule was available, was that of London because of the 
radical change to the system of government in the middle of the period. The Greater London 
Council was abolished in 1985 and local government powers were re-assigned down to the 32 
boroughs and up to committees of boroughs and to central government. There were further 
changes to this system in the later part of the period when the Government Office for London 
was set up.  The only stable unit of government relating to London was the City of London or the 
individual London boroughs but there was a regional authority – Greater London – for half the 
period. The selection of Inner London - not really a governmental unit at all - represented no 
more than the most reasonable compromise. We tested alternatives and as might be expected, 
substituting the value for the largest borough or the GLC as a whole made no material difference 
to the results reported here. 30 
 
 
Table A2: Descriptive Statistics (     
          
   Mean  Minimum  Maximum Std.Dev. 
GR7993A  0.060907  0.045705 0.080905 0.006863
GR7994   0.058504  0.042371 0.082582 0.007208
PG7994   0.00312  -0.00945 0.021158 0.004636
NFG7993A 0.062222  0.054982 0.080061 0.004157
NFG7994  0.059215  0.052076 0.080435 0.004015
LGDP79A  8.898295 8.180563 9.409974 0.249838
LGDP79   8.897684  8.176764 9.40438 0.250391
LPOP79   13.84606  12.75663 16.12136 0.692935
SDGE100S 6.25E-17  -0.02548 0.027523 0.005586
SDG100A   -0.00072 -0.05581 0.031092 0.00791
COAL1   0.157025  0 1 0.365337
COAL2   0.066116  0 1 0.249517
PORT   0.855784  0 19.0447 2.168479
AGR   9.593636  0.36 40.9 9.463737
IND   39.71851  13.9 61.4 9.408668
CEP   0.699174  0 1.6 0.397596
POPDEN   533.7143  44.80827 4478.422 637.7799
UNSTUD   49.0553  0 211.234 38.4697
R_D   1.061977  0 6.865 1.602266
PU   0.49266  0.092686 2.503212 0.363279
WEST   86.48842  -536.664 494.209 232.3885
SOUTH   42.04555  -493.28 639.973 267.6218
EUWEST  16.68476 -1359.79 1304.023 465.4893
EUSOUTH 325.89  -1077.71 1571.106 599.8814
UR7781   7.865207  1.86 17.74 3.316884
 Table A 3: Single start & end date:  Dependent Variable Annualised Growth in GDP  
p.c. 1979 to 1994 
 
R² 0.6671  0.6870  0.6913 
      
Constant -0.034134  -0.036763  -0.038289 
s.e 0.009849  0.009044  0.008955 
LPOP79 0.002019  0.002030  0.002038 
s.e 0.000585  0.000551  0.000551 
COAL1 -0.005819  -0.006243  -0.006051 
s.e. 0.001120  0.001108  0.001073 
COAL2 -0.003572  -0.003446  -0.003268 
s.e 0.001333  0.001365  0.001400 
PORT -0.001509  -0.001528  -0.001539 
s.e 0.000363  0.000347  0.000350 
PORTSQ 0.000071  0.000071  0.000072 
s.e 0.000019  0.000018  0.000018 
PU   0.003058  0.007372 
s.e   0.001346  0.003821 
PUSQ     -0.002078 
s.e     0.001562 
NFG7994 1.035124  1.036209  1.027465 
s.e 0.116819  0.107441  0.106941 
AGR 0.000490  0.000491  0.000538 
s.e 0.000171  0.000169  0.000169 
AGRSQ -0.000012  -0.000012  -0.000012 
s.e 0.000004  0.000004  0.000004 
POPDEN -0.000002  -0.000002  -0.000002 
s.e 0.000001  0.000001  0.000001 
UNSTUD 0.000029  0.000029  0.000024 
s.e 0.000013  0.000013  0.000014 
R&D 0.000576  0.000689  0.000747 
s.e 0.000259  0.000247  0.000255 
CEP 0.002710  0.003759  0.004258 
s.e 0.001302  0.001332  0.001440 
SDGE100 0.173013  0.171889  0.180567 
s.e. 0.075854  0.074110  0.074128 
SOUTH -0.000004  -0.000003 -0.000003 
s.e. 0.000002  0.000002  0.000002 32 
Table A4: Correlations : Set of variables used in population growth models 
 
                                  
 PG7994  NFG7993A  NFG7994  LPOP79  SDGE100S COAL1 COAL2 PORT AGR  IND  POPDEN R_D  PU  WEST SOUTH EUWEST EUSOUTH UR7781 DBENL DDEDK DUKIE DFR  DESPTGR DNIT 
PG7994  1.0000  -0.1521  -0.1789 -0.1515  -0.0309 -0.3603 -0.1528 -0.1125 0.3471 -0.3725 -0.2444 -0.3706 -0.1517  -0.1639 0.6276 -0.0414  0.2150 -0.1146 0.0328 0.1173 -0.4112 0.2899 0.1770 -0.2809 
NFG7993A -0.1521  1.0000  0.9477  0.2502  0.0329  -0.0092 0.0017 -0.0818 0.0387 0.0940 0.1547  0.0087 0.0314 0.3785 -0.1717 -0.1051  -0.1036  -0.1155 -0.0338 0.4538 0.0675 -0.8245 0.2040 0.0632 
NFG7994 -0.1789 0.9477  1.0000 0.2301  -0.0187 -0.0386 -0.0058 -0.0291 0.1252 -0.0230 0.0856  0.0160 0.0548  0.2438 -0.2517 -0.1043  -0.0353 0.0228 0.0963 0.2463 0.1029 -0.8417 0.2358 0.1416 
LPOP79 -0.1515  0.2502 0.2301  1.0000 0.0973  -0.0922 -0.0709 0.1740 -0.1407 0.0581 0.1909  0.0063 -0.0268  0.0556 -0.0570 -0.1306 -0.0629  -0.1141 0.0974 0.1252 -0.1201 -0.2105 0.0507 0.0854 
SDGE100S  -0.0309 0.0329  -0.0187 0.0973  1.0000 -0.0347 -0.3141 -0.1024 -0.0165 -0.0267 0.1653  0.0134 0.0305  0.1268 0.0335 -0.0678  -0.0245 -0.1453 -0.1537 0.1298 0.0000 -0.0446 0.0000  0.0000 
COAL1 -0.3603  -0.0092  -0.0386  -0.0922  -0.0347  1.0000 -0.1148 -0.0765 -0.2486 0.2915 0.2105  0.3140 0.1858  0.1443 -0.2961 0.2294  -0.2905  0.1129 -0.1148 -0.0295 0.4530 -0.0857 -0.1309 -0.1295 
COAL2  -0.1528  0.0017  -0.0058 -0.0709  -0.3141 -0.1148 1.0000 -0.0383 -0.1459 0.1635 0.0912  -0.0163 -0.1175  0.0510 0.0387 -0.0620  -0.1075 0.0699 0.1969 0.0844 -0.0536 0.0470 -0.1184 -0.0799 
PORT -0.1125  -0.0818  -0.0291  0.1740  -0.1024  -0.0765 -0.0383 1.0000 -0.1164 -0.1274 0.0233  0.0578 -0.0272  -0.0218 -0.0637 -0.0026  -0.1367 0.0924 0.3443 -0.1026 0.0216 -0.0355 -0.0862 -0.0208 
AGR 0.3471  0.0387  0.1252  -0.1407  -0.0165  -0.2486 -0.1459 -0.1164 1.0000 -0.5971 -0.3146 -0.4294 0.0578  -0.2265 0.1383 0.0366  0.5818  0.1887 -0.1698 -0.2969 -0.3384 0.0303 0.5631 -0.0005 
IND  -0.3725 0.0940  -0.0230 0.0581  -0.0267 0.2915 0.1635 -0.1274 -0.5971 1.0000 0.3187  0.2139 -0.2014  0.3199 -0.2564 -0.2759  -0.3049 -0.4173 -0.1085 0.3591 0.1084 -0.0320 -0.5417 0.2852 
POPDEN -0.2444 0.1547  0.0856 0.1909  0.1653 0.2105 0.0912 0.0233 -0.3146 0.3187 1.0000  0.1502 -0.0392  0.3326 -0.0133 -0.1351  -0.2106  -0.1660 0.0456 0.3088 0.0363 -0.1840 -0.2018 0.0053 
R_D  -0.3706 0.0087  0.0160 0.0063  0.0134 0.3140 -0.0163 0.0578 -0.4294 0.2139 0.1502  1.0000 -0.0185  0.0847 -0.2715 0.2757  -0.4338  -0.0161 0.0458 -0.1335 0.7121 -0.2335 -0.2818 -0.0399 
PU  -0.1517 0.0314  0.0548 -0.0268 0.0305 0.1858 -0.1175 -0.0272 0.0578 -0.2014 -0.0392 -0.0185 1.0000  -0.0248 -0.1879 0.2618  0.1817 0.1693 -0.1275 -0.1036 0.0615 -0.1032 0.3089 -0.0050 
WEST  -0.1639 0.3785  0.2438 0.0556  0.1268 0.1443 0.0510 -0.0218 -0.2265 0.3199 0.3326  0.0847 -0.0248  1.0000 -0.1651 -0.1629  -0.3546  -0.3114 -0.1058 0.5852 0.0867 -0.3494 -0.2271 0.0864 
SOUTH 0.6276  -0.1717  -0.2517  -0.0570  0.0335  -0.2961 0.0387 -0.0637 0.1383 -0.2564 -0.0133 -0.2715 -0.1879  -0.1651 1.0000 -0.1247  0.0632  -0.0417 -0.0253 0.2744 -0.3896 0.3430 -0.0765 -0.3976 
EUWEST -0.0414 -0.1051  -0.1043 -0.1306 -0.0678 0.2294 -0.0620 -0.0026 0.0366 -0.2759 -0.1351 0.2757 0.2618  -0.1629 -0.1247 1.0000  -0.0258 0.3819 -0.0526 -0.3930 0.4771 0.0361 0.4085 -0.4274 
EUSOUTH  0.2150  -0.1036  -0.0353 -0.0629  -0.0245 -0.2905 -0.1075 -0.1367 0.5818 -0.3049 -0.2106 -0.4338 0.1817  -0.3546 0.0632 -0.0258  1.0000 0.1337 -0.2009 -0.3723 -0.4871 0.1365 0.5821 0.3583 
UR7781  -0.1146 -0.1155  0.0228 -0.1141 -0.1453 0.1129 0.0699 0.0924 0.1887 -0.4173 -0.1660 -0.0161 0.1693  -0.3114 -0.0417 0.3819  0.1337 1.0000 0.0924 -0.5633 0.2287 0.0405 0.2528 -0.1354 
DBENL 0.0328  -0.0338  0.0963  0.0974  -0.1537  -0.1148 0.1969 0.3443 -0.1698 -0.1085 0.0456  0.0458 -0.1275  -0.1058 -0.0253 -0.0526  -0.2009  0.0924 1.0000 -0.1494 -0.1358 -0.1254 -0.1184 -0.0799 
DDEDK 0.1173  0.4538  0.2463  0.1252  0.1298  -0.0295 0.0844 -0.1026 -0.2969 0.3591 0.3088  -0.1335 -0.1036  0.5852 0.2744 -0.3930  -0.3723  -0.5633 -0.1494 1.0000 -0.2865 -0.2647 -0.2498 -0.1685 
DUKIE  -0.4112 0.0675  0.1029 -0.1201  0.0000 0.4530 -0.0536 0.0216 -0.3384 0.1084 0.0363  0.7121 0.0615  0.0867 -0.3896 0.4771  -0.4871 0.2287 -0.1358 -0.2865 1.0000 -0.2406 -0.2271 -0.1532 
DFR  0.2899  -0.8245  -0.8417 -0.2105  -0.0446 -0.0857 0.0470 -0.0355 0.0303 -0.0320 -0.1840 -0.2335 -0.1032  -0.3494 0.3430 0.0361  0.1365  0.0405 -0.1254 -0.2647 -0.2406 1.0000 -0.2098 -0.1415 
DESPTGR  0.1770 0.2040  0.2358 0.0507  0.0000 -0.1309 -0.1184 -0.0862 0.5631 -0.5417 -0.2018 -0.2818 0.3089  -0.2271 -0.0765 0.4085  0.5821 0.2528 -0.1184 -0.2498 -0.2271 -0.2098 1.0000 -0.1336 
DNIT -0.2809  0.0632  0.1416  0.0854  0.0000  -0.1295 -0.0799 -0.0208 -0.0005 0.2852 0.0053  -0.0399 -0.0050  0.0864 -0.3976 -0.4274  0.3583  -0.1354 -0.0799 -0.1685 -0.1532 -0.1415 -0.1336 1.0000 
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Table A5: Correlations : Set of variables used in gdp per capita growth models 
                                   
         
 GR7993A  GR7994  NFG7993A 
NFG79
94  LGDP79A LGDP79 LPOP79 SDGE100S SDG100A COAL1 COAL2  PORT  AGR  IND  CEP  POPDEN UNSTUD R_D  PU  SOUTH DNEI  DBENL DDEDK DUKIE DFR  DESPTGR DNIT 
GR7993A  1.0000  0.9860 0.5397  0.5476  -0.1831  -0.1988 0.2949 0.2018  0.3942  -0.3514 -0.2062 -0.1603 0.2161 -0.1193  -0.1145 -0.1451 0.1392 -0.0862 0.1421 -0.0806 0.2624 -0.0243 0.0803 -0.1393 -0.4363 0.2172 0.2988 
GR7994  0.9860  1.0000 0.5830  0.5875  -0.1547  -0.1743 0.2952 0.1818  0.3714  -0.3484 -0.1696 -0.1452 0.2016 -0.0906  -0.0528 -0.1236 0.1045  -0.0859 0.1065 -0.1216 0.2901 0.0238 0.1179 -0.1491 -0.4566 0.2034 0.3032 
NFG7993A  0.5397  0.5830  1.0000  0.9477 -0.2060 -0.2151 0.2502  0.0329  -0.0051 -0.0092 0.0017 -0.0818 0.0387 0.0940  -0.1124 0.1547 -0.2764 0.0087 0.0314 -0.1717 0.0336 -0.0338 0.4538 0.0675 -0.8245 0.2040  0.0632 
NFG7994  0.5476  0.5875  0.9477  1.0000 -0.2859 -0.2940 0.2301  -0.0187  0.0054 -0.0386 -0.0058 -0.0291 0.1252 -0.0230  -0.1642 0.0856 -0.2250 0.0160 0.0548 -0.2517 0.0752 0.0963 0.2463 0.1029 -0.8417 0.2358  0.1416 
LGDP79A  -0.1831 -0.1547  -0.2060 -0.2859 1.0000  0.9989 0.2191  0.0740  0.0290 -0.0051 0.0308 0.1459  -0.6540 0.5556  0.7263 0.2554 -0.0813 0.1475 -0.0888 0.0291 0.0246 0.1135 0.4256 -0.1012 0.2555  -0.6553  0.2005 
LGDP79  -0.1988 -0.1743  -0.2151 -0.2940 0.9989  1.0000 0.2179  0.0755  0.0221 0.0047 0.0251 0.1543  -0.6600 0.5564  0.7180 0.2586 -0.0813 0.1593 -0.0890 0.0295 0.0091 0.1074 0.4172 -0.0838 0.2589  -0.6669  0.1946 
LPOP79  0.2949 0.2952  0.2502 0.2301  0.2191 0.2179  1.0000  0.0973  0.0708  -0.0922 -0.0709 0.1740  -0.1407 0.0581  0.1098 0.1909  -0.0577 0.0063 -0.0268 -0.0570 -0.0837 0.0974 0.1252 -0.1201 -0.2105  0.0507  0.0854 
SDGE100S 0.2018  0.1818  0.0329 -0.0187  0.0740  0.0755 0.0973  1.0000  0.4295  -0.0347 -0.3141 -0.1024 -0.0165 -0.0267  -0.0768 0.1653 0.1099 0.0134  0.0305 0.0335 0.0347 -0.1537 0.1298 0.0000 -0.0446 0.0000 0.0000 
SDG100A  0.3942 0.3714 -0.0051  0.0054  0.0290 0.0221  0.0708  0.4295  1.0000  -0.0172 -0.2518 -0.1497 0.0549 -0.0506  -0.0261 -0.0082 0.0760 -0.0018 0.0375 0.0157 0.1122 -0.0668 -0.0448 -0.0120 0.0147 0.0180 0.0879 
COAL1  -0.3514 -0.3484  -0.0092 -0.0386 -0.0051  0.0047 -0.0922 -0.0347  -0.0172 1.0000 -0.1148 -0.0765 -0.2486 0.2915  -0.0507 0.2105 -0.1124 0.3140 0.1858 -0.2961 -0.0688 -0.1148 -0.0295 0.4530 -0.0857 -0.1309 -0.1295 
COAL2  -0.2062 -0.1696  0.0017  -0.0058 0.0308  0.0251 -0.0709 -0.3141  -0.2518 -0.1148 1.0000 -0.0383 -0.1459 0.1635  0.2358 0.0912 -0.1401 -0.0163 -0.1175 0.0387 -0.0424 0.1969 0.0844 -0.0536 0.0470 -0.1184  -0.0799 
PORT  -0.1603 -0.1452  -0.0818 -0.0291 0.1459  0.1543 0.1740  -0.1024  -0.1497 -0.0765 -0.0383 1.0000  -0.1164 -0.1274  0.1424 0.0233 -0.1539 0.0578 -0.0272 -0.0637 -0.0119 0.3443 -0.1026 0.0216 -0.0355 -0.0862 -0.0208 
AGR  0.2161  0.2016  0.0387  0.1252 -0.6540 -0.6600 -0.1407 -0.0165  0.0549 -0.2486 -0.1459 -0.1164 1.0000 -0.5971  -0.5641 -0.3146 0.2583 -0.4294 0.0578 0.1383 0.0432 -0.1698 -0.2969 -0.3384 0.0303 0.5631  -0.0005 
IND  -0.1193 -0.0906  0.0940  -0.0230 0.5556  0.5564 0.0581  -0.0267  -0.0506 0.2915 0.1635 -0.1274 -0.5971 1.0000  0.5276 0.3187 -0.2931 0.2139 -0.2014 -0.2564 0.1382 -0.1085 0.3591 0.1084 -0.0320 -0.5417  0.2852 
CEP  -0.1145 -0.0528  -0.1124 -0.1642 0.7263  0.7180 0.1098  -0.0768  -0.0261  -0.0507 0.2358 0.1424  -0.5641 0.5276  1.0000 0.2279 -0.1161 0.0112 -0.2959 0.0575 0.0406 0.5382 0.3777 -0.2619 0.1633  -0.6172  0.1219 
POPDEN  -0.1451 -0.1236  0.1547  0.0856 0.2554  0.2586 0.1909  0.1653  -0.0082 0.2105 0.0912 0.0233  -0.3146 0.3187  0.2279 1.0000 -0.0422 0.1502 -0.0392 -0.0133 -0.0220 0.0456 0.3088 0.0363 -0.1840 -0.2018  0.0053 
UNSTUD 0.1392  0.1045  -0.2764  -0.2250  -0.0813  -0.0813 -0.0577 0.1099 0.0760  -0.1124 -0.1401 -0.1539 0.2583 -0.2931  -0.1161 -0.0422 1.0000 -0.1484 -0.0026 0.2107 0.0258 -0.1241 -0.1585 -0.1540 0.3117 0.0169 0.1091 
R_D  -0.0862 -0.0859  0.0087  0.0160 0.1475  0.1593 0.0063  0.0134  -0.0018 0.3140 -0.0163 0.0578  -0.4294 0.2139  0.0112 0.1502 -0.1484 1.0000 -0.0185 -0.2715 0.0062 0.0458 -0.1335 0.7121 -0.2335 -0.2818 -0.0399 
PU 0.1421  0.1065  0.0314  0.0548  -0.0888  -0.0890 -0.0268 0.0305  0.0375  0.1858 -0.1175 -0.0272 0.0578 -0.2014  -0.2959 -0.0392 -0.0026 -0.0185 1.0000 -0.1879 -0.0434 -0.1275 -0.1036 0.0615 -0.1032 0.3089 -0.0050 
SOUTH  -0.0806 -0.1216  -0.1717 -0.2517 0.0291  0.0295 -0.0570 0.0335  0.0157 -0.2961 0.0387 -0.0637 0.1383 -0.2564  0.0575 -0.0133 0.2107 -0.2715 -0.1879 1.0000 -0.2606 -0.0253 0.2744 -0.3896 0.3430 -0.0765  -0.3976 
                                               
DNEI  0.2624 0.2901  0.0336 0.0752  0.0246 0.0091  -0.0837 0.0347  0.1122  -0.0688 -0.0424 -0.0119 0.0432 0.1382  0.0406 -0.0220 0.0258  0.0062 -0.0434 -0.2606 1.0000 -0.0424 -0.0895 -0.0814 -0.0752 -0.0710  0.5312 
DBENL  -0.0243 0.0238  -0.0338 0.0963 0.1135  0.1074 0.0974  -0.1537  -0.0668  -0.1148 0.1969 0.3443  -0.1698 -0.1085  0.5382 0.0456 -0.1241 0.0458 -0.1275 -0.0253 -0.0424 1.0000 -0.1494 -0.1358 -0.1254 -0.1184 -0.0799 
DDEDK  0.0803 0.1179  0.4538 0.2463  0.4256 0.4172  0.1252  0.1298  -0.0448  -0.0295 0.0844  -0.1026 -0.2969 0.3591  0.3777 0.3088  -0.1585 -0.1335 -0.1036 0.2744 -0.0895 -0.1494 1.0000 -0.2865 -0.2647 -0.2498 -0.1685 
DUKIE  -0.1393 -0.1491  0.0675  0.1029 -0.1012 -0.0838 -0.1201 0.0000  -0.0120 0.4530 -0.0536 0.0216  -0.3384 0.1084  -0.2619 0.0363 -0.1540 0.7121 0.0615 -0.3896 -0.0814 -0.1358 -0.2865 1.0000 -0.2406 -0.2271 -0.1532 
DFR  -0.4363 -0.4566  -0.8245 -0.8417 0.2555  0.2589 -0.2105 -0.0446  0.0147 -0.0857 0.0470 -0.0355 0.0303 -0.0320  0.1633 -0.1840 0.3117 -0.2335 -0.1032 0.3430 -0.0752 -0.1254 -0.2647 -0.2406 1.0000 -0.2098  -0.1415 
DESPTGR 0.2172  0.2034 0.2040  0.2358  -0.6553  -0.6669 0.0507 0.0000  0.0180  -0.1309 -0.1184 -0.0862 0.5631 -0.5417  -0.6172 -0.2018 0.0169  -0.2818 0.3089 -0.0765 -0.0710 -0.1184 -0.2498 -0.2271 -0.2098 1.0000 -0.1336 
DNIT  0.2988  0.3032  0.0632  0.1416 0.2005  0.1946 0.0854  0.0000  0.0879 -0.1295 -0.0799 -0.0208 -0.0005 0.2852  0.1219 0.0053 0.1091 -0.0399 -0.0050 -0.3976 0.5312 -0.0799 -0.1685 -0.1532 -0.1415 -0.1336 1.0000 
 
 